The Home Office is trying to deport dozens of refugees to Iraq, with at least 30 people currently held in detention centres awaiting forced removal. But instead of using high-profile charter flights, the Home Office is now turning to a handful of major airlines to take Iraqi deportees as scheduled passengers: Royal Jordanian, Turkish Airlines, and Qatar Airways. Strong resistance by deportees and supporters may yet win out though, and several flights have been cancelled in the last week.

At the start of April, the International Federation of Iraqi Refugees (IFIR) announced that it was in contact with several dozen Kurdish and other Iraqis who had been rounded up and detained in Colnbrook, Campsfield, Morton Hall and other UK detention centres. Many assumed a mass deportation charter flight was in the offing, as this is a common Home Office pattern following a sudden wave of arrests.

The last charter to Iraq had been booked for 21 June 2011. That flight was called off at the last minute as campaigners blockaded the coaches leaving Colnbrook and Harmondsworth and lawyers scrambled behind the scenes to get removal papers quashed. By 2012 Iraqi refugees appeared to be on reprieve, as years of campaigning by IFIR and others had finally pushed the Iraqi national government passing a resolution to refuse deportation flights.

Even with the apparent weakening of the Iraqi government’s resolve, it seems that a charter flight is still too much of a political risk. Politicians in the Iraqi parliament are moving again on this issue: last month over 100 MPs signed a call for a new parliamentary resolution against deportations. Also, here in the UK, a blockade of a charter flight to Nigeria and Ghana at Stansted Airport on 28 March helped raise the profile of these mass expulsion night flights.

But the Home Office can also collaborate with commercial airlines to deport people. The first of the arrested Iraqis, 36 year-old Aras Ismail from Kirkuk, was put on a scheduled Royal Jordanian flight to Baghdad. Four security guards reportedly locked him in the plane’s toilet for the duration of the flight, gagged and handcuffed with his legs tied together. His home of Kirkuk is currently a war zone under partial control of Daesh (ISIS). Just the day before the flight, there were reports that Daesh had executed 12 people in the town.

As reports of Aras Ismail’s ordeal made it into regional press, and campaigning against the deportations grew, the flights seemed to reduce in number. And then a new airline appeared on the scene. Since 2005, Royal Jordanian had been the only commercial airline carrying individual deportations to Iraq. But, whether or not because of the bad publicity and campaign pressure, the next wave of deportations at the start of May instead featured Turkish Airlines’ flights via Istanbul to Bahgdad.

Qaranmin Amin, also from Kirkuk, was deported on a Turkish Airlines flight from Heathrow at 6pm on 4 May. Assan Yaba Assan, from Mosul, was due to fly on 6 May, again with Turkish Airlines, but his flight was cancelled on the day. Following an appeal from IFIR and Assan’s partner, Turkish Airlines received phone calls and emails asking them not to collaborate in the deportation, which may have been a factor in its cancellation.

Another three deportations scheduled with Turkish Airlines for 9 May were also cancelled at the last minute. One of the refugees successfully resisted, and this may have led the airline or the Home Office to call off all three.

Then on 10 May, another airline got involved: Qatar Airways. It was scheduled to take Soran Ahmed on a Heathrow flight via Doha, although this flight was also cancelled.

Corporate Watch has contacted Royal Jordanian Airlines, Turkish Airlines, and Qatar Airway for comment. None of them responded to us.

After his flight was stopped, Assan Yaba Assan was taken back to Colnbrook detention centre, and is still being held there along with many other Iraqi refugees. The Home Office will be hoping that campaign pressure dies down and they can try to deport them again. IFIR and other supporters will do their best to make sure that doesn’t happen. Key will be getting support inside Iraq to reaffirm the deportation ban. But active pressure from the UK and elsewhere can also play an important role, particularly by persuading the airlines not to take more forced passengers.

Dashty Jamal of IFIR told Corporate Watch: “Iraqi people are still paying the price for the imperialist actions of the British and American governments, as war continues to rage in the country. We ask all freedom-loving people to stand against these actions, and we call on the governments to immediately halt these deportations.”

The next deportation flight is scheduled with Turkish Airlines again, with Haram Kalif, who has a three-month pregnant partner living in the UK, due to be sent to Kirkuk on 26 May. IFIR and friends are calling for people to keep communicating with Turkish Airlines, and any other airlines that continue to be involved, demanding they stop these flights.

Turkish Airlines is largely owned by the Turkish government, not known as a great respector of public opinion. However, the company is very careful about its image, boasting that it has been awarded the title of “Europe’s best airline” six years in a row. This might make it more likely to listen to complaints about the “service” it provides for the Home Office’s unwilling passengers.

For more information:

Contact the International Federation of Iraqi Refugees (IFIR) on 07856032991, ifir@hotmail.comand sign their petition here. 

Check IFIR website for more news and updates on Iraqi deportations: http://www.federationifir.com/en

Turkish Airlines

UK main phone number: 020 7471 6666

London office: 149 Hammersmith Road, Lyric House, W14 0QL
infolondon@thy.com twitter:
@TurkishAirlines
@TK_HelpDesk

Press Office: Yahya ÜSTÜN, Senior Vice President of Media Relations

+90 212 463 63 63 / Ext. 11173-11153

Press and Communication line: +90 212 463 64 44

email: yustun@thy.com, press@thy.com

Royal Jordanian

London Office: 1 Beadon Rd, London W6 0EA

LONTSRJ@RJ.COM / LONTMRJ@RJ.COM

twitter: @royaljordanian

Qatar Airways

UK Reservations Number: 0330 024 0125

Central London Office: 10 Conduit St, Mayfair, London W1S 2QR

London Harrods Ticket Desk: Harrods Lower Ground Floor, 87-135 Brompton Road, London SW1X 7XL

Press Office: Qatar Airways Group, Corporate Communications Department
Tel: +974 4022 2200, Fax: +974 4022 5350
E-mail: qrmedia@qatarairways.com.qa

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Kurdistan is currently divided between four countries: Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. In each of the parts of Kurdistan, Kurdish identities and cultures have been repressed for generations. This book, by Eliza Egret and Tom Anderson, gathers together first-hand accounts of the struggles for a new society taking place in Bakur and Rojava – the parts of Kurdistan within the borders of Turkey and Syria.

The setting up of local assemblies and co-operatives, as well as radical women’s and ecological movements, are rapidly gathering momentum in Kurdistan. The book gives a simple introduction to democratic confederalism, the idea that has inspired many of those involved in these movements.

The book also compiles accounts from Kurdish people who are oppressed by the state of Turkey and profiles some of the companies that are complicit in their repression. The interviews give suggestions of how people outside of Kurdistan can act in solidarity.

Buy the book or click here to download this book for free.

The post Struggles for autonomy in Kurdistan appeared first on Corporate Watch.

Lead photo caption: A commune meeting in Amude in Rojava’s Cizîrê canton, November 2015

By Tom Anderson and Eliza Egret

The Kurdish region is currently undergoing a transformation. People are organising themselves in grassroots people’s assemblies and co-operatives, declaring their autonomy from the state and their wish for real democracy. Feminist and anti-capitalist ideas are flourishing. These changes are inspired by a new idea: democratic confederalism. These movements have the capacity to transform the reality of millions of people in Kurdistan, and potentially spread to the wider Middle East. Last year we visited Bakur, the part of Kurdistan within Turkey’s borders, and Rojava, the Kurdish majority autonomous region in Syria. This article examines the theory and practice of democratic confederalism in Bakur and Rojava, and goes on to discuss how we can engage in solidarity, while maintaining an honest and critical perspective.

We have tried to understand the theory and practice of democratic confedralism as best we could, and have taken advice from many Kurdish friends, as well as activists who have visited the region. We hope that we have given an accurate description. However, any mistakes or innacuracies are entirely our own.

Some History

Historically, the region known as Kurdistan lay within the East of the Ottoman Empire. After the Second World War, the British, French and their allies divided up the empire. Many Kurds lobbied the imperialist powers for a state of their own, but were unsuccessful. In 1923, the Turkish republic was founded, espousing a Turkish nationalist ideology. Any reference to non-Turkish/Sunni Muslim ethnic identities within Turkey was criminalised. The speaking of Kurdish was banned. A series of Kurdish uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s were repressed by Mustafa Kemal’s autocratic government, with tens of thousands killed.

Kurdish populations in the Middle East are now divided between four states: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. In the Kurmanji Kurdish language, the four parts of Kurdistan are known respectively as North (Bakur), South (Bashur), West (Rojava) and East (Rojhilat).

In 1978, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) was founded, based on Marxist-Leninist ideas of national liberation. The PKK began an armed struggle, with the aim of achieving an independent Kurdistan.

During the 1980s and 1990s the PKK rose up against the Turkish state, calling for independence. Armed struggle was met by torture, assassination and ethnic cleansing aimed at the entire Kurdish population by the Turkish government’s security forces. Over 3000 Kurdish villages were systematically burned during the 1990s.

From Marxist-Leninism to Democratic Confederalism

After the capture of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the messages and statements put out by the PKK began to change. Influenced by the communalist ideas of US social-ecologist Murray Bookchin, as well as Emma Goldman and the Zapatistas, Öcalan and others in the PKK began to criticise nation-states, and the PKK’s stated goal changed from the establishment of an independent Kurdistan to democratic confederalism. We will summarise here what Öcalan and others say about democratic confederalism, before looking at how the ideas have been put into practice in Rojava and Bakur.

On the nation state Öcalan says:

“The right of self determination of a people includes the right to a state of their own. However, the foundation of a state does not increase the freedom of a people. The system of the United Nations that is based on nation states has remained inefficient. Meanwhile, nation states have become serious obstacles for any social development.” [1]

And on democratic confederalism:

“Democratic confederalism is the contrasting paradigm of the oppressed people. Democratic confederalism is a non-state social paradigm. It is not controlled by a state. At the same time, democratic confederalism is the cultural organisational blueprint of a democratic nation.”

“Democratic confederalism is based on grassroots participation. Its decision making processes lie with the communities. Higher levels only serve the coordination and implementation of the will of the communities that send their delegates to the general assemblies.”[2]

Looking more closely at these ideas, democratic confederalism is based on the idea that society can be run truly democratically through networks of grassroots assemblies or communes, which form confederations with each other across regions. Local assemblies elect representatives at the village or street level and these representatives represent their assembly at the level of the city or region. Again, the city or region elects representatives to represent them at higher levels.

The idea is that the real power remains with the population, and not with state bureaucracies. According to Öcalan, a form of government would still be necessary, but only to implement the decisions made by the assemblies, whose representatives would be elected at a street or neighbourhood level.

These ideas owe a lot to the work of the US social ecologist, Murray Bookchin. In 1990 Bookchin wrote:

“What then is confederalism? It is above all a network of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies… The members of these confederal councils are strictly mandated, recallable and responsible to the assemblies that choose them… Their function is thus a purely administrative and practical one, not a policy making one…”[3]

In his pamphlet, ‘Democratic Confederalism’, Öcalan argues for a society that respects ethnic, religious and cultural differences. He states that:

“It is a natural right to express one’s cultural, ethnic, or national identity with the help of political associations. However, this right needs an ethical and political society. Whether nation-state, republic, or democracy – democratic confederalism is open for compromises concerning state or governmental traditions. It allows for equal coexistence.”[4]

Öcalan sees democratic confederalism as a model for the whole Middle-East:

“Finally, let me state again that the fundamental problems of the Middle East are deeply rooted in the class civilisation. They have tightened with the global crisis of the capitalist modernity. This modernity and its claim to dominance cannot offer any solutions, not to mention a long-term perspective for the Middle-East region. The future is democratic confederalism.”[5]

Democratic confederalism emphasises the formation of a social economy, based on co-operatives organised at the grassroots level. In Rojava, co-operatives are linked with the communes themselves. According to Saleh Muslim, co-chair of the PYD, the PKK’s affiliated party in Rojava:

“Co-operative associations are the best embodiment of co-operative economy, the association will be based on communes which mean society is the primary representative of the economy.”

Feminism is emphasised in the theory of democratic confederalism. According to Öcalan: “Liberating life is impossible without a radical women’s revolution.”[6] In Bakur and in Rojava, local assemblies, communes, political parties and municipalities have established a system of co-representation, or co-chairs, where each position must be filled by one man and one woman. Many movements and organisations have a quota for female participation. For example, we spoke to an ecology assembly in Bakur in July 2015 who told us they would not accept any more men until a certain amount of women had joined.

People have been attempting to implement these ideas in Kurdistan for over ten years. In 2005, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) was established with the aim of implementing the ideas of democratic confederalism in all four parts of Kurdistan.[7]

Democratic confederalism in practice in Bakur

In Bakur, the region of Kurdistan within Turkey’s borders, people have been trying to put these ideas into practice for over a decade. The Democratic Society Congress (DTK), set up in in 2007, acts as an umbrella organisation, and aims to establish democratic confederalism in Bakur. It meets every three months and is made up of representatives of different ethnic groups and political parties as well as representatives of local assemblies. It operates as a parliament, and attempts to create a new society under the weight of repression from the existing one. Since the establishment of the DTK, local assemblies have been set up all over Bakur. The DTK has also set up regional commissions to deal with issues such as ecology, economy, education, language, religion, culture, science, diplomacy, women and young people.

People involved in these movements often refer to wanting to achieve democratic autonomy through people organising themselves through grassroots assemblies or communes. Following on from this, the term ‘democratic confederalism’ is used to describe networks of these local assemblies joining together in a confederation.

The movement for democratic autonomy is supported by the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), who have 59 seats in the Turkish parliament and are in control of many municipalities in Bakur. Another party, the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), stands in some municipal elections, but primarily works toward the establishment of democratic autonomy. The PKK also supports it.

Since the start of the movement for democratic confederalism in Bakur, activists have been met by intense state repression. The PKK is listed as a banned terrorist group in Turkey. Because the PKK is part of the KCK, the umbrella organisation which aims to establish democratic confederalism in all four regions of Kurdistan, the KCK has been proscribed too. Thousands of people have been arrested for connections with the KCK, including many politicians from the HDP and DBP.

This has not stopped the movement from growing. When we visited Bakur in July 2015, local assemblies and commissions were organising co-operatives. For example, we visited several farming co-operatives in the Wan (Van in Turkish) region which had been established on land donated by landlords to the Democratic Regions Party. Profits from the co-operatives are shared among the workers. We also visited a co-operative shop which had been set up by the DTK’s economic commission in Wan.

Women’s assemblies and ecology assemblies are also part of the DTK. For example, environmental activists have formed an ecology assembly in the city of Batman, which they told us was represented in the DTK. Women also have a parallel umbrella organisation, the Free Women Union.

Increasingly, people are turning toward the Democratic Regions Party (DBP) and the assemblies to solve disputes, rather than going to the police and courts. In the Wan region we personally observed local people asking the DBP to arbitrate in disputes.

Since the HDP’s electoral successes in June and November 2015, the police and army have intensified attacks against Kurdish people, particularly activists involved in the movement for Democratic Autonomy. In many areas people have erected barricades against the police and read out declarations of autonomy. In these cities, the Turkish police and military have launched an all out war, using tanks, mortars and helicopter gunships to attack residential streets. Armed self-defence units, including female only units, have been set up at the local level in many places in response.

The DTK has announced that the whole of Turkey, not just the Kurdish region, could be run through self-governing autonomous regions. According  to a December 2015 DTK statement:

“Democratic Autonomy as the solution to the Kurdish problem cannot be separated from the democratisation of Turkey as a whole. The declarations of Democratic Autonomy are thus steps toward democratising Turkey. We consider them legal and necessary and proper for all the peoples of Turkey. Undoubtedly local democracies would take different forms according to the conditions and needs of their area, region, and community. Under the local autonomy of diverse identities, each area can adapt democratisation into its own circumstances.”

Like Öcalan, the DTK hope that the the assembly system will take over many of the functions of the state:

“Some functions—economy, judiciary, defence—would remain at the centre, but the rest– like education, agriculture, tourism– are to be devolved to the autonomous regions.”

The statement goes on to say that:

“The governing model that should be dominant in the world today is indisputably democracy. No government that centrally administers every street, neighbourhood, city and town can be legitimate; democracy requires the autonomy of local units.”

Democratic confederalism in Rojava

In 2003, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), aligned to the PKK and the movement for democratic confederalism, began to organise in Rojava. From 2005, people began to try to put the ideas of democratic confederalism into practice. In August 2011 an umbrella organistion called the Movement for Democratic Change (TEV-DEM) was formed. In December 2014, Janet Biehl interviewed Aldar Xelîl, reportedly one of the co-founders of TEV-DEM, about the origins of the organisation:

“The story of TEV-DEM is very long. In 2003 we mobilized under the name of PYD. Up to 2005 we operated like a party. Then after 2005 we decided we couldn’t achieve social and political organization in society as a party. We needed a different kind of roof for this. So we were on a quest, a search. After 2005 we left the political stuff to the PYD and organized society in an autonomous way, independent of the PYD.”[8]

As the Syrian uprising against President Bashar Al-Assad gathered momentum in 2011, the PYD and TEV-DEM took the opportunity of the ensuing power vacuum to organise assemblies on a large scale, in the model of democratic confederalism.

In 2012, as the Assad regime weakened, this movement was able to take control of most of Rojava from the regime, and take over government buildings, schools and hospitals. Rojava was organised into three autonomous cantons: Cizîrê, Kobanî and Afrin. For a critical analysis on why the regime withdrew from Rojava see Joseph Daher’s interview with Syrian activist and journalist Shiar Nayo here.

To broaden participation in the movement, the People’s Council of West Kurdistan (MGRK) was formed, made up of diverse groups and political parties. Meanwhile, some parties, many of whom are loyal to Massoud Barzani’s ruling KDP in neighbouring Bashur, chose to remain outside this system in opposition.

Here’s a diagram showing the system that’s developed since then, based on the description by Ercan Ayboğa in ‘Revolution in Rojava’. ‘Revolution in Rojava’ is currently only available in German, and the English translation will be published this summer. The council system is shown on the left, you may want to zoom in, in order to read the diagram more easily.

The Commune

The commune is the base level of Rojava’s council system. In general, communes are made up of 30-400 households in a city, or a whole village in the countryside. The entire population of the commune meets every two weeks, and it elects a board. The board meets every week, and all members of the commune are able to attend board meetings if they wish. All posts must be filled by a male and female co-chair. All representatives are recallable by the membership of the commune.

We visited a Mala Gel, or people’s house, run by Şehit Hozan commune in Amude in Rojava’s Cizîrê canton, where we spoke to the commune’s male co-chair. Şehit Hozan commune represents 400 families in their neighbourhood who vote for the board of the commune. We were told that the commune has commissions dealing with services, economy, Kurdish language teaching, organising lectures, self-defence, reconciliation and justice.

The commune’s reconciliation and justice commission tries to resolve problems that arise between members of the commune. For example, we were told that the commission had recently been asked to mediate when someone was injured in a road traffic accident and when there had been a dispute about land ownership. We were told that often the commission is able to resolve these disputes.

The commune’s self defence commission organises armed self-defence of the commune. Commune self-defence units operate autonomously from the People’s Protection Units of the YPG and YPJ and the Asayîş security forces.

The commune also organises public meetings. We were invited to one of these, organised by Şehit Hozan commune. It was attended by over fifty local women and men and was on the themes of anti-capitalism and feminism. The talk was given in Kurmanji (the Kurdish language spoken in Rojava) and translated into Arabic.

The Neighbourhood/Village Community Council and the District level

The board of each commune in Rojava sends representatives to the Neighburhood/Village Council, a body made up of 7-30 communes. In turn, the Neighbourhood/Village Council, elects a board, who represent them at the third level, the District level.

The district level is made up of representatives of the board from the second level, plus places are reserved for five representatives from the political parties and civil society organisations within TEV-DEM.

We met the Democratic Youth Union in Kobanî, previously called the Revolutionary Youth, who are one of the civil society organisations who have places reserved for them within this system. They told us:

“The target of our organisation is to build equality between men and women and to protect the environment. Our organisation is not just for Kurdish youths. We also have Arabic, Armenian and Turkmen members.”

People’s Council of West Kurdistan (MGRK)

The fourth level of the council system is the People’s Council of West Kurdistan (MGRK), made up of representatives from all district councils and representatives of the groups within TEV-DEM. The MGRK is supposed to provide the coordination between Rojava’s three cantons, but the current war situation prevents the MGRK from meeting together in one location.

Every level of the council system, from the commune upward, has a women’s council. These women’s councils are formed by the Yekîtiya Star women’s union (now called Kongira Star). We met with Yekitiya Star in Kobanî. We were told that women from Yekîtiya Star were going to all of the communes in the area and organising trainings on women’s empowerment.

The social contract

In January 2014 a social contract was agreed for the three cantons by 50 political parties and organisations. The agreement of the social contract was an attempt to bring wider participation to politics in Rojava. It emphasises gender equality and equal rights for all ethnicities, the right to be educated in one’s own language and guarantees that those seeking political asylum will not be deported. The social contract invites other regions of Syria to adopt the canton model and form self-governing regions that can work together in a confederation.

The social contract sets out a structure for the formation of governments, known as Democratic Autonomous Administrations (sometimes called the Democratic Self Administration), in each of the three cantons. According to the contract, a legislative council is elected by the whole population, which in turn elects an executive council. At the time of writing elections have not yet taken place and the legislative council is made up of the parties and organisations that agreed to the charter, together with representatives of different ethnic groups.

We have heard plans for the MGRK in each canton to be allocated 40% of the seats in the legislative assembly, integrating the council system with the Democratic Autonomous Administration.

Municipal councils were taken over when Assad’s officials left in 2011. Under the new social charter these municipal councils will be managed by the relevant Executive Council. The first elections for these municipal administrations were held in 2015.

The declaration of federation

In March 2016 representatives from Rojava’s three cantons met in Derike, in Cizîrê canton, and agreed a formal statement of federation. This means that Rojava’s three cantons are now part of the “Democratic Federation of Rojava – Northern Syria” (DFRNS). The statement proclaims that the DFRNS aims “to achieve a democratic and federal Syria, rather than a centralized administration, by taking into account the historical, geographic, cultural, demographic and economic characteristics when establishing democratic federations.”. “Self-administrative regions” within the DFRNS would organise themselves “based on councils, academies, communes and cooperatives.”

For a critical Syrian view on the declaration of federalism see here.

Although the movement for democratic confederalism in Rojava has its roots in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy, it is multi-ethnic. We met Arab and Aramean (Syriac) people, who were involved in both the communes and the Democratic Autonomous Administration (DAA) in Rojava. Places in the DAA are reserved for representatives of different ethnic groups.

A call for critical solidarity

When we talk about Kurdistan, and particularly about Rojava, the debate is often sidelined into whether the revolution is perfect. We often debate whether society in Rojava is utopian, even while our own social movements are far from perfect.

The argument is often polarised into complete support for all aspects of the movement in Rojava or a position which says that the imperfections within the Rojava experiment mean that we should have nothing to do with it.

We would like to strongly argue for a stance of critical solidarity, to maintain a critical, undogmatic perspective which sees the social movements in Bakur and Rojava for what they are. To criticise the problematic aspects but also to be in solidarity with the positive, liberatory movements taking place, such as the resistance against Daesh, the struggles for autonomy, the fight against Turkish state repression, the movements towards feminism, towards building co-operatives and toward anti-capitalism. These movements have the potential to transform society both in Kurdistan and in the Middle East.

But there are aspects of the situation in Rojava where we think it is important to maintain a critical perspective. For example, at the moment political parties, and their associated military and security organisations, hold a lot of power in both Rojava and Bakur. In both Bakur’s DTK and the council system in Rojava, places are allocated for representatives of political parties. This ensures that political parties always have a voice within the structures of democratic confederalism, whether or not they represent the views of the people in the grassroots assemblies. The most powerful of
these parties is the PYD, which, according to Shiar Nayo, has acted to suppress independent activists and those critical of their policies. Many people within the movement say that these political parties are only there because the movement is in its infancy, and that in the future there will be no need for them, but they are obviously one place where power could consolidate itself. Kurdish writer Ercan Ayboğa told us that he is hopeful that power will gravitate towards the grassroots:

“political parties are instruments of political and ideological approaches which have a certain role. Their role has become in the last years slowly less significant in political life. Increasingly the different self-organised structures, women, youth and so on, have become more important. It’s a slow process because over the decades Kurdish people thought only in the category of political parties and it takes time to make changes.”

Other bodies worth critically examining are Rojava’s executive and legislative councils. In the theory of democratic confederalism, these bodies should only carry out the will of the council system. But it remains to be seen whether power will remain with the grassroots, or gravitate toward the government level. As Kurdish Anarchist Zaher Baher puts it:

“I got the impression that as long as the power of the DSA [Democratic Autonomous Administration] increases, the power of TEV-DEM decreases and the opposite could be right too”.[9]

Also, the existence of a centralised security force, Asayîş, which is largely independent of the council system, seems to run counter to the idea of power being with the grassroots communes. But in the context of the Syrian civil war and attacks by Daesh, good security is clearly necessary and we were happy about the frequent Asayîş checkpoints, which helped to keep us safe during our visit in 2015. Many in the movement, including members of Asayîş, maintain that the organisation will dissolve itself when it is no longer necessary. Practical steps are being taken toward this end, with the setting up of armed defence forces by the communes. Bedran Gia Kurd of TEV-DEM told us that TEV-DEM was engaged in providing support and training to the communes to set up their own defence forces. Because of this process, Asayîş does not have a monopoly on the use of force in Rojava.

Perhaps the most powerful forces in Rojava are the People’s Protection Forces of the YPG and YPJ. These forces have been key to the survival of democratic confederalism in Rojava. However, there is evidence that they have acted oppressively in the past, firing on demonstrators in Amudê in 2013. Also, how many people in Rojava actually have a say about the alliances formed by these military organisations? One such example is the changing nature of the alliance with the US, which may be necessary for the success of the fight against Daesh, but which we would say, has the potential to threaten the grassroots social revolution in Rojava.

In 2014, when Kobanî was under attack by Daesh, the US, reluctantly and belatedly, began bombing in coordination with the YPG and YPJ. US air support was an important factor in the liberation of Kobanî. Since then military co-operation with the US against Daesh has increased.

Many people in Rojava have a critical perspective on the alliance. When we spoke to Bedran Gia Kurd of TEV-DEM, he said:

“There is daily coordination with the US military as our enemy is the same, but there is no long-term agreement. There is no guarantee for this coordination. It is temporary. Maybe in the future there won’t be this coordination. Coordination in the future will be on the basis of how to protect our principles. So if this coordination compromises our project, we will not agree to it.”

But, as Zaher Baher points out, Saleh Muslim, PYD co-chairperson, in an interview with the Washington Kurdish Institute, has put forward a different point of view:

“America is a superpower that fosters democracy globally, and tries to develop and disseminate it throughout the world.”[10]

Other PYD figures have called for international business investment in Rojava, seemingly without recognising that it would threaten the moves toward an anti-capitalist, cooperative economy in Rojava.[11]

Of course, these statements by politicians may be intended as pragmatic steps toward gaining international support for their struggle for autonomy and fight against Daesh. But, at best, these politicians are playing an extremely dangerous game. At worst, they are completely at odds with the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist elements of the movement.

Another issue is that of the reverence for the figure of Abdullah Öcalan. In almost every interview we carried out about democratic confederalism people would say that their ideas come from their leader. This habit of deferring to Öcalan runs counter to the ideas that the grassroots have the power to shape society themselves. As Zaher Baher puts it:

“For some time, Abdullah Öcalan, in recent books and text messages, has denounced and rejected the state and authority. But until now I have not heard that he has rejected his own authority and denounce those people calling him a great leader and who work hard to give him a sacred position. Öcalan’s attitude cannot be correct unless he also rejects his own authority and leadership.”[12]

We have heard that some of Öcalan’s work, which is thus far only available in German, does discuss critically his role as leader. We have not seen a translation of these writings. But the issue isn’t only about whether Öcalan rejects a leadership role. It is that he is treated as a leader by many within the movements for democratic confederalism. This is particularly striking in the women’s movements where, on the one hand women say that they are for women’s self organisation, and on the other say that their ideas come from Öcalan.

We believe that the most useful solidarity with the developing movements toward democratic confederalism is not to either reject all of the positive steps being taken because of the movement’s imperfections, or to only talk positively about them. Rather, we should remain a supportive and honest friend to the movement, a friend who does not shy away from taking action in solidarity with those fighting for a better society, but who is also not afraid to speak honestly, openly and critically.

Grassroots movements with the capacity to change society  

The movements for democratic confederalism in Rojava and Bakur are a place where anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-authoritarian and anti-state ideas are flourishing. They have the capability to transform the reality of society for millions of people. These changes are being made by people at a grassroots level, who are inspired by the ideas of the revolution, not by politicians or government institutions.

The establishment of communes and assemblies in Bakur and Rojava has empowered people to make decisions over many areas of their lives which were previously controlled by the state. For example, since the establishment of communes in Rojava there have been creative attempts to construct new methods of dealing with problem behaviour. As described above, each commune has a truth and reconciliation commission to deal with problems that arise in the community. For more serious incidents, such as murder, there is a ‘people’s court’ at the district level, with judges elected by the commune, that hears the case. These judges still have the power to send people to prison, but, Ercan Ayboğa, a Kurdish activist from Bakur who has visited Rojava, told us in 2016:

“There are still prisons in Rojava but the number of prisoners is very low. For example, in [the town of] Serekaniye the number of prisoners is 20 compared to 200 in Assad’s time. The courts try to avoid sending people to prison. They try to use other measures like sending people to work in another area, asking people to leave an area for a certain period of time, or arranging education or training for the accused person.”

However, according to Ercan, this system has been criticised by people within Rojava and people have been experimenting with an alternative, the ‘justice platform’. In this new system the justice and reconciliation commissions can ask for support with serious problems by forming a justice platform. The justice platform is made up of 200-300 people from “women, youth, other political movements and other organisations from the neighbourhood. They discuss the case and try to reach consensus.”

The fact that no one force has a monopoly on the use of violence and that, in Rojava, the communes are developing armed defence forces may be a key factor in keeping power at the grassroots level. The fact that the grassroots are armed makes it more difficult for power to consolidate itself with, for example, the Democratic Autonomous Administration or the military.

Women’s movements in Bakur and Rojava are perhaps the most inspiring element of the current situation in Kurdistan. When we were in Bakur and Rojava we met women who were determined to struggle against patriarchy, and it felt like there truly was an opportunity for changes to occur. We met with a women’s academy in Amed (Diyarbakır in Turkish) who were involved in organising against male violence. They told us that they worked with women affected by violence from their husbands and organised collective action against it. They also organised trainings on women’s empowerment within their communities. Women in both Rojava and Bakur told us that men did not simply accept these ideas, but that making change was an ongoing struggle.

The movements for democratic confederalism have also opened space for anti-capitalist ideas. The talks organised by the communes in Rojava, for example, are a powerful way to spread anti-capitalist ideas. The setting up of co-operatives is an important way that people can be involved in creating grassroots alternatives. According to German economist Michel Knapp:

“While in North Kurdistan the established communes and co-operatives operate under mass repression, in the liberated territory of Rojava there are efforts to create a new form of economy independent of both capitalist and feudal relations of exploitation. This is being undertaken against the background of the drama of the Syrian war: thousands have been murdered and half of the population is homeless.”[13]

Knapp goes on to quote Dr Dara Kurdaxi, an economist and  member of the committee for economic revival and development in Afrîn canon, Rojava:

“We need new models for organisations and institutions. Those which are called collective, communal economic models, sometimes referred to as social economies. This is the method we are using as a foundation, so that the economy in Rojava can pick up and develop.”

The fact that there is a broad consensus that the economy should be organised along co-operative lines means that there is space and momentum for the setting up of co-operatives by the grassroots in Rojava. This is being done in a bottom up way by a diverse range of communes and related organisations. For example, the Foundation of Free Women in Rojava is currently setting up a number of women’s co-operatives in Cizîrê canton.

We have a lot to learn from these movements, and the first step towards solidarity is to educate ourselves. Many of the groups we visited in Rojava asked for people from outside to come and learn about their movements. By making stronger connections with activists working at the base level of democratic confederalism; for example the communes, co-operatives and women’s organisations, we can broaden our understanding and begin to forge genuine solidarity and also generate ideas and inspiration for our own movements.

Over the coming weeks we will be publishing a series of interviews with people involved in the movement for democratic confederalism.

To read more about Democratic Confederalism in Rojava, read Anja Flach, Michel Knapp and Ercan Ayboga’s forthcoming book Revolution in Rojava, which will be published in English in July 2016.

Corporate Watch will be releasing a book, ‘Kurdish Struggles for Autonomy’, in May 2016

The post Democratic confederalism in Kurdistan appeared first on Corporate Watch.

Lead photo caption: Children attending a demonstation in the cemetery in Roboski to commemorate those killed in the 2011 Roboski massacre, July 2015

Turkey’s latest attacks on its Kurdish population follow on from decades of repression and ethnic cleansing by the state of Turkey, its military and its police. In the 1990s, more than 3,000 villages in the Kurdish countryside were destroyed and effectively wiped from existence. The Kurdish population were uprooted from their land, and many were forced to migrate to the cities. Roughly three million people had to flee their homes. Thousands of people were also killed and many disappeared. The aim of burning down the villages was to assimilate the Kurdish population, in an attempt to erase their culture, their language, and their identities.

Today, Various Kurdish cities have declared themselves autonomous of the state, and many of those involved in these movements for autonomy are the same people who were forced from their villages in the 1990s, or their daughters and sons. The police and military are currently waging a bloody war against this movement.

Last year, Corporate Watch visited the village of Roboski and its surrounding areas. We interviewed Botan Şanstêrk*, who talked to us about the trauma of being a Kurdish child in the 1990s. Botan spoke quietly and emotionally to us. A lifetime of grief was evident on his face and in his voice.

Botan is calling for a boycott of tourism in Turkey and for demonstrations against Turkish Airlines. For more info on the tourism boycott see here.

He also spoke to us about the Roboski massacre, which took place on 28 December 2011. when 34 Kurdish cross border traders were killed by a Turkish F-16 strike. To read more about the Roboski massacre see here.

CW: Where were you born?
“I was born in Eski [Old] Hilal in 1985. There were about 6000 people living in Eski Hilal at that time, and 800 houses. The nature was really green and there was lots of fresh water. The town had a revolutionary soul; it had been burnt down seven times during the Ottoman era because the town was against Ottoman rule. In the old days, Armenians and Assyrians also lived in this area.”

Photo caption: A deserted village close to Roboski, which was forcibly depopulated by the Turkish military in the 1990s

CW: Can you describe your experiences of being a child in the 1980s and 1990s?
“We were against the system and the government saw us as an enemy. Each house had martyrs [family members who had been killed]. They were either killed by the government or they went to become guerillas [for the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)] and had been killed by the Turkish military.

When I was a child, the military took people away all the time, even at night. They often took people to the military base. Villagers were put into prison for three or four years for wearing the puşi [Kurdish headscarf].

When I was 1 or 2 years old the military took women and men to an open area of land and they tortured the men to force them to become rangers [a paramilitary organisation made up of Kurdish villagers, which worked alongside the Turkish military, also known as ‘village guards’].

Most of the bad treatment happened in my village between 1992 and 1994. The mayor of the town went missing. They killed him in a car and then set the car on fire. The state did it but no-one was prosecuted. Later on, a military officer wrote a book and gave the names of the killers. The state killed three of my relatives during this time.

When I was about 8 years old, in 1993, the military told us that they were going to demolish our homes. I saw the army taking our furniture from our house and burning it. My mother saw the soldiers with my school bag and told them not to burn it. They burnt it anyway, with my school books in. When the military were leaving, they killed our animals and demolished some of our houses. We needed to find safe places to stay, so we stayed at camps near the village.

After the military left, the government banned food from coming to us. For eleven months they put an embargo on our village and the school and health centre closed down. We had to walk 5km to a school in another village – 10km per day, which was tough for someone so small. When I was at school, I was beaten and punished by the Turkish state teachers because I couldn’t pronounce Turkish correctly.  

The military came back in the Spring. They put everyone in one big area. They told us that we had to leave the village by September. They said that if we didn’t leave, they would burn down the village. They said, “If you are Kurdish, we will take you to the border of Iraq and you have to leave. If you say that you are Turkish you can settle down all around Turkey.” They also said that we had to speak Turkish, and not Kurdish, at home.

In 1994, a few thousand villagers left for South [Iraqi] Kurdistan. They went to eight different camps. My mother’s brothers went and my brother followed later.  

I moved to Yeni [New] Hilal with my parents, on the main road. We built this new village ourselves. The government assisted us because we declared that we were Turkish. But then they cut the financial help, so we had to sell our animals. The army moved us to Yeni Hilal because they wanted to divide us and make us less strong. They wanted to control us and they could do this better from the new location.  
 
In 1995, when I was ten years old, the military took my father to an army base. They hung him by his arms for fifteen days. He was the head of an extended family. They were trying to force him to give people’s names so that the military could force people to become rangers. My father said that he wouldn’t give anyone’s name, and that he would never become a ranger. They threatened to kill him. Some people voluntarily came from the family and gave their names so that he would be released.

When I was 11 or 12 years old, my older brother refused to do military service. The military put a landmine in our garden and my brother died. My other brother was taken to the military by force.  He had to go to Isparta for 18 months.

During this period, it was worst for the children because they stole our childhood. After school time, military officers would come and teach us about how great it was to be a Turk. They tried to brainwash us at school too.

We had to have guns in our houses to protect ourselves. My sister was doing cleaning and she accidentally shot herself. She died at 17 years old.

Between 1998 and 2004, I left Yeni Hilal and went to boarding school. I paid money not to go in the army – about 18,000 lira [£4,400]. My parents were quite old at that time and they suffered a lot economically because of this.

The Hilal people were always against assimilation. We saw how people were treated by the government and so some of the village became [PKK] guerillas. My schoolmate joined the guerillas after his brother was killed. Roughly 800 people from our village have become guerillas in the 30 years that the PKK has existed.”  

CW: What is daily life like now?
“When the state kills people in the villages they say it was the PKK. They then give one relative from the dead person’s family a government job. They want to assimilate us economically. There’s not many jobs here so the only solution is to become a ranger.

We see the military bases every day. This is a form of violence against us and they make me uncomfortable. The army doesn’t drive along our road much. They use the other side of the river, but I hear helicopters often. I woke up to the sound of them a couple of days ago and I thought that something was happening again. It reminds me of those days in the 90s and of the childhood I didn’t have.”
Photo Caption: The mlitary base overlooing the Kurdish village of Roboski

CW: Can you tell us about the Roboski massacre on 28th December 2011?
“When the Roboski massacre occurred, I rushed to the spot straight away. We collected the body parts. The bodies were taken to Uludere and I stood there whilst people washed the bodies. I knew some of the people who were killed.

When the military carried out the massacre, they thought that no-one would speak out about it. But three villages have come together and they’re doing regular demonstrations.  

It has become the culture of the state to massacre nature, humans and animals. If there was a forest fire in central and western Turkey, the government would try everything to put the fire out. Here in Kurdistan, the military try everything to destroy the people, the nature, the animals.

Twenty years ago we had forests and animals. But they burnt the forests and killed the animals. Our historical places are the same. They’re destroying them as well, along with the old Armenian and Assyrian churches.

The state has a big hatred for Kurdish people and Kurdish places. They want to flood Hasankeyf and the surrounding villages [The state-approved Ilısu Dam will displace up to 78,000 people of mostly Kurdish ethnicity when it is completed, and flood the ancient town of Hasankeyf]. Rojava [the autonomous mostly-Kurdish region in northern Syria] is another example of the state’s hatred. If Kurdish people outside of Turkey want something for themselves, if they want their freedom, the Turkish state is not happy about it.”

CW: You have suffered throughout your life due to the weapons used by the Turkish military. What do you think of the companies making the weapons?
“I don’t want weapons produced if they are to be used in Kurdistan. I would prefer them to produce pens. I’d prefer that the blue of the pen flows rather than the red of the blood. If someone helps to make these weapons, they are responsible for what happens.”

CW: Do you think people should take action against the sale and export of weapons to Turkey?
“It would be great if people tried to take action to stop this.”

CW: What else do you think people outside of Kurdistan can do in solidarity?
“If I were a tourist I wouldn’t come to this country. People can protest against Turkish Airlines, for example. This is a state airline. People can boycott and protest against state products and companies, not the civilian ones. I think this can have an effect. Journalists and activists can also write about the situation here.”

What you can do

Campaign for a boycott of tourism in Turkey until the violence against Kurdish people ends.

Campaign against arms exports to Turkey. To read about the companies supplying arms to the Turkish police and military click here and here. Also see Campaign Against the Arm’s Trade’s list of companies supplying weapons to Turkey.

– Join the demonstration against French arms company Thales’ factory in Crawley on 8 April. Thales are an exporter of arms to Turkey.

– There will also be a demonstration organised by Palestine solidarity activists against Elbit in Shenstone in the West Midlands on 8 April. Elbit also supply weapons to Turkey.

– Stop the Arms Fair are planning to pose some tricky questions to the annual general meeting of UK arms company, BAE Systems. Contact research(at)caat.org.uk to request a proxy share if you would like to attend. BAE have repeatedly applied for export licenses for the sale of weapons to Turkey.

To find out more about campaigns in support of the Kurdish movement for autonomy, go to http://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/

*We have used a pseudonym, at the interviewees request.

The post ‘They stole my childhood’: The trauma of being a Kurdish child in the 1990s in Turkey appeared first on Corporate Watch.

Lead Photo: Servet Encü in the village where he was born, burnt down by the Turkish military in the 1990s

Today, Turkey continues its brutality in its war against its Kurdish population. The state is imposing new curfews daily in the south-east of the country. Hundreds of citizens have been killed so far, whilst the western mainstream media and politicians remain largely silent about the massacres.

Anti-militarist activists in the UK, however, are taking action against atrocities carried out by states such as Turkey. Last week, activists occupied the roof and blockaded the DPRTE arms fair in Wales, where several companies that sell weapons to Turkey were exhibiting.  More activists are due to stand on trial in April after blockading the gates of the DSEI arms fair in London to try to disrupt the set-up of the fair. In September 2015, DSEI welcomed Turkish officials and military companies, whilst the Turkish government’s Defence and Aerospace Industry Exporter’s Association was its ‘International Partner’. Earlier this month, a protest was held outside the Home Office against the ‘Security and Policing’ arms fair, which was being held at an air base in Farnborough. The UK government’s arms export body had invited a delegation from Turkey to attend.

Photo above: Protesters blockading the gates of the DSEI arms fair in 2015

Photo caption: Protesters against the DPTRE arms fair in Cardiff on March 16th hold a Kurdish Solidarity Banner

There are numerous weapons companies which supply Turkey’s police with armoured vehicles, guns, teargas and water cannons, which are used on a daily basis against Kurdish citizens. Read the list of companies here. A list of some of the companies supplying weapons to the Turkish army can be found here.

As Turkey bombards its Kurdish cities with bullets and mortars and terrorises citizens with its tanks, helicopters and surveillance drones, arms companies are literally making a killing. On March 9, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that Turkey has approved $5.9 billion in new ‘defence’ projects.

Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) unveiled its new Anka Block A unpiloted drone in February. Turkish Deputy Defense Minister Suay Alpay stated: “We are now engaged in a critical anti-terror fight … These assets built by the local industry will augment our fight.”

International arms companies are also making millions from Turkey’s desire to arm itself to the teeth. Ten T-129 attack helicopters were delivered to the Turkish military last year. They were produced by British-Italian arms company AgustaWestland (which fully merged with Italian arms giant Finmeccanica this year) and TAI. Seventeen more of these helicopters are due to be delivered this year.

Meanwhile, this month the Pentagon authorised the selling of smart bombs to Turkey, in a deal worth millions of dollars. “The deal came timely as we are deeply engaged in asymmetrical warfare and need smart bombs,” a Turkish military official said. US companies ENF and General Dynamics have been awarded the contracts to provide the BLU-109 bombs.

US giant Lockheed Martin, the world’s largest arms company, who brag on their website that they have a “long history of partnership with the Republic of Turkey,” is another of the many international arms companies that has a history of profiting from Turkey’s aggression against Kurdish populations within Turkey and in neighbouring Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava (the autonomous, majority Kurdish region in northern Syria). Lockheed provides Turkey with F16 fighter jets, as well as Hellfire missiles, and is producing new F-35 fighter jets for the Turkish military. Lockheed states that their $399 billion F-35 project is the “world’s most expensive weapons programme.” Turkish arms companies, who are manufacturing components for the F-35, are also making billions from the contract.

In September 2015, Lockheed announced that it was producing and supplying Turkey with a“next-generation, air-to-surface standoff cruise missile for the F-35 fighter jet,” partnering with Turkish arms company Roketsan. The companies stated that they would provide “live flight testing on Turkish F-16s.”

Meanwhile, Turkish warplanes are continuing their ongoing attacks on Kurdish villages in the Qandil region of Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) has its main bases. Arms industry website Janes stated that on March 14 “nine Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcons and two McDonald Douglas F-4 2020 Phantom aircraft were involved in the strikes against the PKK’s main headquarters area in the Qandil Mountains.” In reality, the fighter jets, accompanied by drones, destroyed Kurdish villagers’ houses during the bombardments.

Turkey also continues its provocations and attacks across its border into the majority-Kurdish, autonomous region of Rojava, in northern Syria. Turkey has repeatedly shelled and bombed YPG positions in Rojava. The Turkish goverment has made several threats to launch a ground invasion of Rojava.

Lockheed Martin and the Turkish government’s cozy relationship continues, and on the March 15, the two were in talks, discussing the possibility of the arms company providing Turkey with an “urgent” Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS).

This month in London, activist Zelda Jeffers was found guilty of criminal damage for demonstrating at Lockheed Martin’s offices. Zelda drew attention to the words of Lockheed Martin’s Executive Vice President, Bruce Tanner, who had boasted about Lockheed’s “indirect benefits” from the violence in Syria.

You can listen to Tanner on Soundcloud here.

The Roboski Massacre: A case study of the use of Lockheed Martin’s F16s  to massacre Kurds in Turkey

On one of our recent visits to Bakur (the Kurdish region that lies within Turkey’s borders), we visited Roboski and its surrounding villages. On 28 December 2011, thirty-four people, many of whom were teenagers, were massacred in this region by Turkey’s military. The villagers were crossing the mountains on mules to collect sugar and diesel from their relatives in South [Iraqi] Kurdistan. They were killed when two F16 fighter planes bombed them. For Kurds, the Roboski massacre will go down in history as one of the most atrocious crimes by the state against its Kurdish population.

When we visited the Roboski area in 2015, we were shocked by the number of Turkish military bases on the mountains, keeping an ever-present surveillance on the Kurdish civilians. On the roads surrounding the villages, we encountered military checkpoint after checkpoint and were questioned as to why we were there and where we were going.

Photos above: Military bases on the mountaintops overlooking the village of Roboski and the surrounding countryside

We interviewed Servet Encü, a Kurdish man who was born in 1979 and lives in the village of  Şantiye. Servet was one of the few survivors of the Roboski massacre. In 1993, when he was thirteen years old, Turkey’s military burnt down his village and its residents were tortured (in the 1990s, Turkey burnt down or forcibly evacuated thousands of Kurdish villages).

Interview with Servet Encü

Corporate Watch: What was life like here before the massacre?

In the 1960s and 1970s we didn’t have a border. It was easy to go to the Iraqi side and exchange sugar, tea and walnuts. In the 1990s, we couldn’t make a living any more because we were forced to leave our village and there were no trees or crops, so we started to do cross-border trade.

The military put landmines on the border in the 1990s to try to stop the trade. Between 2006 and 2009, one military officer allowed us to do border trade because we had no money. He retired and after that the highest officer stopped us.

CW: What happened on the day of the Roboski massacre?

It was cold and there was snow that day. The boys played football before they went. We wanted to bring diesel, a few cigarettes and some sugar over the border from South Kurdistan. We wanted to keep the sugar for ourselves and sell the diesel.

People left from Gülyazı, Şantiye and Roboski villages. We left our village at 3pm. The military were dropping bombs from the Gülyazı Koyü military base to scare us off. But bombing happened all the time at that time – it was normal. Thirty-eight of us continued towards the border and thirty-five others turned back.

150 people could have died that day [as 150 people had planned to go]. Some people had heard the sound of drones that afternoon and decided not to go, and I think some people were warned not to go by some responsible people in their villages, but we didn’t hear anything. Others didn’t go because they hadn’t sold their diesel from last time and didn’t have enough containers.

At around 6pm we went to the Haftanin guerilla camp in South Kurdistan, close to Zahko. We have relatives from South Kurdistan who bring sugar and diesel to the guerilla camp. At 8pm we started to return. We were in two groups. The other group was 500m away from mines, on the South Kurdistan side. At the number 15 border stone, we waited for a phone call because we wanted to know if there were soldiers around. We found out that the military had blocked the roads.

At 8.40pm an F16 came. With F16s you don’t hear them until they’re close. At the time, I was checking on my mule. I was 15 metres away from the rest of the group. Suddenly the military dropped a big bomb. There was a light from the bomb. I was thrown 50 metres away and I fell down. There were human and animal pieces raining from the sky. I screamed. I acted like I had died and still the bombing continued for forty-five minutes. I rolled down the mountain towards the Turkish side and fell into a big hole in the snow. I thought that the bombs were going to kill me or I was going to freeze there.

Forty-five minutes later they attacked and killed the other group. They hadn’t moved from their position after we were bombed because they’d waited there to see if they could help us.

Photos above: Servet’s photos of some of the people killed in the massacre

At the same time, the villagers were ringing the military base, asking about the bombing. The military said:“We are just trying to scare them off.” I had a radio and asked if anyone could hear me. One villager from Roboski heard me. I said:“They have killed my friends and I’m the only one alive.” The villager didn’t believe me because they had spoken to the military. The villager rang the military back and said: “You killed them”. After that the military retreated.

Two or three hours later, people were able to come to help. I heard voices coming but I was in the hole. I screamed to the people to help me. I didn’t have any injuries. They got me out of the hole.  The villagers removed me from the scene of the massacre and brought me down the mountain.

The military didn’t let an ambulance through.  If an ambulance had come then five or six other people could have survived.

A boy who survived the massacre had pieces of a bomb in his face. He was trying to call his relatives but his mouth was full of snow. He was in intensive care for one month and in hospital for one year. Some of the young boys lost their heads, legs and arms. Six or seven people were still alive and they died from freezing. The soldiers didn’t help us.

People put the bodies and body parts into bags. They were hurrying because they didn’t want to be accused of helping terrorists. I was worried that the government would put guns by the bodies and say that the people killed had been terrorists. We were worried about what the government might do or say.

Tractors and mules came for the bodies and brought them down to the sports area, where the boys had played football the day before, in the morning.

The military said: “We are going to take the bodies to Malatya.” There’s an airforce base there. The villagers didn’t accept this. The military said that they were PKK guerillas and that this is what they do with guerillas’ bodies. In the end, ambulances took the bodies to Uludere. A medical doctor came for an autopsy.

CW: Can you tell us about the funeral?

The body parts of the humans were mixed with the mules. We washed the bodies. We put them in thirty-four coffins on the December 29. The next day we had a funeral. One day later most of the people in Turkey were celebrating new year.

No government people came to the funeral. The AKP [the ruling party] said that they were coming but the villagers didn’t want them to. We put yellow, green and red [Kurdish] flags on the coffins. Later, the judge called people to court to ask why they had used these flags. We said: “The Kurdish party supported us so we used these colours.”

CW: Did Turkish TV report the massacre?

Someone called a Kurdish TV channel, ROJ TV, and they announced the massacre on the news because on Turkish TV channels you didn’t hear anything. For 28 hours the Turkish channels didn’t report anything.

CW: How many people died in your family?

My wife, Sevim, lost two brothers. They were 15 and 21 years old. She lost a total of nine people in her family, and I lost eleven.

CW: You spoke out about the massacre. Were you the only survivor to do this?

The others didn’t talk about the massacre. One was in hospital and they paid the youngest survivor money to so that he wouldn’t talk. The judges called one man and gave him money to become a ranger [or village guard, a paramilitary organisation that works with the Turkish military]. The judges called me and offered me money to become a ranger, too. I said no.

An Inspector came from Ankara and asked me if I wanted money. I said, “I want justice for thirty-four people who died”. The governor of Şırnak invited me to his town. I went with two others – one was a father who had lost his son. The governor asked me if I wanted money. He told me that I had lost my mind and that I needed to be cured in hospital because I said that I wanted justice. I said that I would go to the hospital, but I escaped to South Kurdistan with my family three months after the attack. We stayed there for nine months. Then we moved home using the same border trade route, because I don’t have ID to cross legally.

I could go to prison or I could be the thirty-fifth person who dies. Whatever they do, I will talk about it. Because I survived the Roboski massacre, I want to help bring justice.

CW: Have you suffered from more state repression since then?

At the beginning of 2014, lots of military trucks came here. They started shooting and one boy was shot and injured. People damaged their trucks and broke their guns. I wasn’t there. The military didn’t want people to do any more border trade. They wanted to make a road between the military bases, crossing the massacre point. A couple of days later, the military came and raided houses and they made the excuse that they were searching for missing guns.

They broke my door down and destroyed my picture of the thirty-four people killed in the massacre. I was arrested at 4am. Six family members of those who were massacred were also arrested and we were released at 9pm. I was arrested because I spoke out about the massacre.

On the March 8 2014 somebody came and attacked our house with a Kalashnikov. It was a professional person. We couldn’t find any bullet cases. They had collected them. Luckily, no one was hurt. No one came to help us that night. The military came the next day. They were outside the house with guns.

CW: Have you done any cross-border trade since the massacre?

When we were living in the old village [in the 1990s] we were growing everything. We had our own wheat and fruit. Now I still trade over the border as I have no other income. My grandfather did it, my father did it. We have never killed anyone. Whenever I go past the massacre place now, I remember what happened.

CW: What do you think of the companies who make the weapons that carried out the massacre?

I don’t want them to be sold to the Turkish military. These weapons are killing us. They are killing Kurdish people.

CW: The British government provides licences to sell weapons components to Turkey. Do you think they should do this?

They shouldn’t give permission. If there were no weapons we could have peace. We don’t want war, we want peace. We want support so that we can have peace and so that we can speak our own language. My mother tongue is Kurdish. If I were to tell you not to speak your mother tongue of English, would that be right? The worst that could happen to me has happened. Now I live only for them.

CW: Thanks a lot for talking to us, Servet.

The culpability of the US

The attack was carried out with F16 aircraft, supplied to Turkey by Lockheed Martin. The Wall Street Journal reported at the time that the convoy was spotted by a US Predator drone. The US passed the information on to the Turkish military, who carried out the attack. Although the US Department of Defence have said that it was not their decision to carry out the attack, the US military is clearly partly responsible for the massacre as it enabled the Turkish military to carry out the attack through providing the location of the convoy. The Predator drone is manufactured by US arms company, General Atomics.

Relatives of those killed in the massacre and their supporters hold a demonstration at the cemetery where those killed in the attack are buried every Thursday. They are calling for justice over the killing of their loved ones. You can read about their campaign on http://barisicinaktivite.com (mainly in Turkish).

Photo above: Relatives of those killed and their supporters demonstrating for justice at the cemetery in Roboski

Take action

– Join the demonstration against French arms company Thales’ factory in Crawley on 8 April. Thales are an exporter of arms to Turkey.

– There will also be a demonstration organised by Palestine solidarity activists against Elbit in Shenstone in the West Midlands on 8 April. Elbit also supply weapons to Turkey.

– Stop the Arms Fair are planning to pose some tricky questions to the annual general meeting of UK arms company, BAE Systems. Contact research(at)caat.org.uk to request a proxy share if you would like to attend. BAE have repeatedly applied for export licenses for the sale of weapons to Turkey.

To read more about the Roboski massacre see this report on statecrime.org

The post International arms companies make a killing in Turkey: a case study of the Roboski Massacre appeared first on Corporate Watch.

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Thirty people in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, lost sight in one or both eyes after being injected with a version of the drug Altuzan in a government hospital in March 2013. Nine had to have eyes removed as a result of the problems caused by the injections.

The case has caused much protest and controversy in Kurdistan, with many people already heavily critical of the two ruling parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – for the lack of decent services provided. The director of the hospital concerned has since resigned.

The newly-formed Eye to Eye campaign has demanded the Ministry of Health disclose all relevant information about the case, including details of who supplied the Altuzan and whether it was a counterfeit version. Altuzan is the brand name that the Avastin drug is sold under in Turkey.

Questions have also been raised over the role of FDAS, a British company that, according to their website, signed an “agreement” with the Kurdistan Regional Government in September 2012 to provide “analytical testing services to the Kurdistan Medicines Control Agency (KMCA) to support actions to improve the quality of medicines in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”. Their website contains two articles on the subject, and a video of their representatives signing the agreement.

The company has not responded to accusations made by the Eye to Eye campaign that it should have tested the drugs prior to the injections, and that it failed to properly do so.

Corporate Watch asked the Nottingham-based company for a response to this but the response we received was puzzling. The company said it did “not have and has never had a contract with the Kurdistan Regional Government to provide its services”, appearing to contradict its own website.

Their statement to us continued:

“Food & Drug Analytical Services does provide testing services indirectly and on an as requested basis to the Kurdistan Medicines Control Agency (KMCA). This is in our capacity as a service provider for one of our clients Britt Pharm Ltd, Company Number 07325977 located in Grimsby, Lincolnshire.”

Search for Britt Pharm in Companies House and you’ll find a tiny company, the last annual accounts of which showed assets of just £3 and declared the company to be dormant. You’ll also find that until April 2012 it was called FDAS Britt Ltd.

The most recent annual return registered for Britt Pharm/FDAS Britt says its owners are Hussein Al-Bayat, Khalaf Merza and Mahdi Ismail, who is also the sole director. It is unclear how they are connected to the Nottingham-based FDAS, which is owned by current and former directors Stephen Jones, Larissa Taylor, Trevor Ray and Eric Hilton plus the venture capital investors East Midlands Regional Venture Capital Fund No 1 and the publicly-funded East Midlands Early Growth Fund.

Corporate Watch has so far been unable to get in contact with Grimsby-based Britt Pharm/FDAS Britt, and the Nottingham-based FDAS would not say what the link was between the two companies, or give us contact details.

The Ministry of Health of Kurdistan has since published details of the contract and, sure enough, FDAS Britt is named. Intriguingly though, the individual named with the company is Eric Hilton, Sales Directors and shareholder of the Nottingham-based FDAS.

The contract says FDAS Britt has had to put a security deposit of $1.5m in the Kurdistan Governmental Bank, and that the KMCA can deduct fines from that sum if things go wrong. But if Britt Pharm/FDAS Britt still only has assets of £3, where has that money come from?

‘Fundamental uncertainty’

The Nottingham-based FDAS also chose not to respond to the most important accusation of the lot: that they failed to adequately monitor and inspect the medicines that caused the problems.

FDAS did tell us that they had carried out a test on a sample of Altuzan in April 2013, the month after the injections were made. According to their statement, they were not “party to the details or the outcome of this investigation” and instructed us to contact Britt Pharm to find out more.

Corporate Watch asked the Kurdistan Regional Government’s London representation for clarification but, after initially being promised a response, nothing has come.

The most recent accounts for the Nottingham-based FDAS (under its full name of Food & Drug Analytical Services Ltd) show the company is in a troubled financial situation, with negative equity of £546,000. The auditors also express a “fundamental uncertainty” over the company’s “ability to continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future”.

It is understandable therefore that FDAS is keen for the current controversy to blow over, especially as they say they are “looking forward to strengthening our relationships with our Erbil and MENA [Middle East and North Africa] countries clients.”

But if they continue to avoid questions about their role in the KRG, people in Kurdistan will continue to demand answers.

If you have any additional information about the role of FDAS in the KRG, please get in touch on 00442074260005 or contact[at]corporatewatch.org.

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Air Italy, the airline that carried some 40 Iraqi refugees to Baghdad two weeks ago in the first mass deportation to southern Iraq from the UK since the US-UK invasion in 2003, has said it will not undertake any more deportation flights in the future. An email by Cesari Francesco, the company’s ground operation manager, sent to the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, said: “I inform you that, in the future, we will refuse to operate air transport with asylum seekers or refugees.”

According to the Independent (24 October 2009), Air Italy’s decision to end its contract with the Home Office was taken at a board meeting immediately after the return of the Iraqis, claiming it was “a matter of conscience.” A statement by the company said, “The business sometimes must communicate with the consciousness, and this was the reason, conscience.”

Anti-deportation campaigners had circulated the company’s contact details and scores of protest letters were emailed and faxed. Italian activists had also vowed to target the company for deporting people to their possible death.

The Air Italy deportation flight to Baghdad had lead to a public outcry and caused the UK government a lot of embarrassment as 34 of the 44 deportees were not admitted by the Iraqi authorities at Baghdad airport and had to be flown back to the UK. A number of them have since gone on hunger strike demanding their immediate release. A Home Office statement at the time said they will “iron out” the difficulties they faced and “expect to carry out another flight.”

The 15th October flight is said to have cost some £250,000 and carried up to 100 immigration officers and private security guards on board. Other private companies involved with the deportation included G4S, the UK Border Agency’s main contractor for detainee escort services, and it subcontractor WH Tours, the Crawley-based coach company that transports deportees from detention to the airport.

In protest, the International Federation of Iraqi Refugees and the Stop Deportation Network organised two public demonstrations in Parliament Square and outside the Home Office on 17th and 26th October respectively. A public forum against mass deportation flights has also been organised for 7th November. For more details, see http://stopdeportation.net.

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A Brighton family was forcibly deported to Algeria last week on an Air Algérie flight from Heathrow. The first attempt to deport them on a British Airways flight three days before had failed, allegedly because there was ‘a problem with their tickets.’ Both times campaigners from Brighton and London gathered at the airport and leafleted crew members and passengers to try and get them to protest on board, which may explain why the deportation was cancelled the first time. Earlier that week, about 50 Iraqi refugees refused asylum were not so lucky to have ‘tickets with problems’ or protesters leafleting at the airport. Instead, they were surreptitiously taken through the VIP entrance at Stansted airport and put on a special ‘ethnic charter flight’ operated by a Czech airline, which carried them to Erbil in northern Iraq. A few deportees were taken off the plane, just before it took off, after last-minute interventions by solicitors and MPs. One deportee was flown back to London after winning a High Court injunction.

Safe as death

Until last week, Assia Souhalia and her husband, Athmane, had been living in the UK for seven years. Their two-year-old daughter, Nouha, was born in Brighton in 2006 and had lived there all her life. Assia fled Algeria in 2002 in fear of her life after her family had suffered years of violence. Two of her brothers were murdered in two separate and premeditated shootings in 1993 and 1994, despite having no involvement in political activities. Upon hearing of the death of her eldest son, their mother suffered a heart attack and died. Since then, Assia’s family have repeatedly received death threats and, in 1994, another brother was murdered. In 2007, her sister was badly wounded in a bomb attack. Only one man has been arrested in relation to these murders. Two of Assia’s remaining brothers and sisters have also fled the country.

The Home Office’s policy of deporting ‘failed asylum seekers’ to Algeria has been highly controversial, to say the least. In 1997, an Algerian policeman was deported from the UK. Upon arrival at Algiers airport, he was arrested by Algerian security forces and murdered. In 2007, the Appeal Court halted the deportation of three Algerians after judges ruled that the government “could not be certain” that they would be safe from torture.

Technical problem or effective campaigning?

Nevertheless, Assia and her family were ‘snatched’ from their home in Hove early in the morning of 11th February and taken to Yarl’s Wood detention centre in Bedfordshire pending deportation. The Home Office booked a British Airways flight (BA895) at 8:40am on 17th February to carry them to Algiers. A group of anti-deportation campaigners from Brighton and London gathered in Heathrow’s Terminal 5 that morning and leafleted passengers and crew members, trying to persuade them to complain to the pilot about the deportation, in the hope that the family would be taken off the plane before takeoff. The family, however, never boarded the plane and were taken back to Yarl’s Wood detention centre, allegedly because there was a “problem with their tickets,” as they were told.

One of the campaigners leafleting at the airport told Corporate Watch that most of them were stopped-and-searched by police under airport bylaws for leafleting. An independent journalist who was also there was stop-and-searched under the Terrorism Act for taking photos of the protesters being searched.

Two days later, the family were told they were due to be deported the following day, 20th February. The family were not given ‘removal directions’ until the evening before the flight but campaigners deduced that it was Air Algérie flight number AH2055, which was to leave Heathrow’s Terminal 2 at 14:05. Indeed, they went to the airport again and leafleted and spoke to most passengers but, unfortunately, that did not stop the deportation going ahead this time.

‘Responsible air travel’?!

Airlines such as British Airways and Air Algérie, which are happy to carry deportees to their possible death and torture as long as they sell tickets, have repeatedly been the subject of complaints and protests from anti-deportation campaigners. Last year, more than 1,000 Nigerians backed a call to boycott BA unless it apologised to the 136 passengers who were ordered off a flight to Lagos after they complained about the forced deportation of a man on board. In 2005, the United Network of Detained Zimbabweans called for boycotting BA and daily pickets at BA offices in London and Manchester were held as campaigners accused the airline of “playing a leading role” in the deportation of failed asylum seekers to Zimbabwe when other airlines had “refused to be dragged into [such a] public relations nightmare.”

Operation Con-similar

On Monday, 16th February, between 50 and 55 Iraqi refugees were forcibly deported to Iraqi Kurdistan (northern Iraq) on a special charter flight that left Stansted around 5pm and arrived in Erbil on Tuesday morning. About 80 Iraqi ‘failed asylum seekers’ had been rounded up over the previous two weeks and kept in detention pending their ‘removal’. Three people were taken off the flight following last-minute interventions by their solicitors and MPs. One deportee had won a High Court injunction but was still deported, only to be flown back to London the following day. Other solicitors have complained that the open-ended Removal Directions (i.e. deportation details) and deporting people sooner than expected meant that they did not manage to get judicial reviews or injunctions in time.

The charter flight appears to have been operated by a Czech company (possibly Czech Airlines) as the plane stopped for refuelling in the Czech Republic and there were, according to one of the deportees, signs saying ‘Czech Republic’ on the plane. The coaches that transported the deportees from Oakington, Haslar and Dover detention centres to Stansted airport were operated by WH Tours and Woodcock Coaches. The five coaches were accompanied, of course, by G4S vans. Group 4 is contracted by the Home Office to carry out deportations and detention ‘escort services’.

The first forced deportation of Iraqi Kurds from the UK took place on 19 November, 2005. 15 men were then taken to an undisclosed airport at night, handcuffed, beaten and forced onto a military plane headed for Erbil through Cyprus. The ‘operation’ sparked a lot of anger and protest and deportations to Iraqi Kurdistan were halted for a while until they were resumed in September 2006 (see here). Deportation charter flights to Iraqi Kurdistan have since become more frequent. Monday’s flight was the seventh time in the last seven months that people have been deported to Iraqi Kurdistan by charter flight.

The code name given by immigration authorities to charter flights deporting refugees to Iraqi Kurdistan is ‘Operation Consimilar’. Before last week’s flight, Hamburg International had been the main operator of Iraq deportation flights.

Safe as a war zone

One of last week deportees, Muzhdah, told the International Federation of Iraqi Refugees (IFIR) that they were accompanied by approximately 100 ‘bodyguards’. “When we arrived in Erbil,” he said, “they wouldn’t let us open the blinds to look outside. [Kurdistan Regional Government] security men took us off the plane with handcuffs and batons. They gave everyone $100 when we got off but, what’s that [worth]? I don’t feel safe and my partner, who I was going to marry before they deported me, is back in the UK.”

Although not suffering full-scale warfare like other parts of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan is by no means exempt from fear, violence and social and economic problems that have turned the whole country into an unbearable place to live. In addition, it is littered with mines that continue to kill and injure people. It remains politically dangerous for those who originally left because of persecution by the two main Kurdish parties or Islamist groups, and large numbers of internally displaced persons who do not have permanent homes or jobs or decent living conditions still reside there.

Dashty Jamal of IFIR explains: “Iraqi Kurdistan is not ‘safe’, as the Home Office claims. The US-UK-led war and occupation have turned Iraq, including the Kurdistan region, into a mess. People are fleeing the country everyday, so how can you say it’s ‘safe’?” Accusing the Kurdistan Regional Government of colluding with the UK government, he adds: “It is mad that people who’d fled war and persecution are being sent back to the mercy of the very same government that persecuted them before. We call on all concerned people to take a stand against the Home Office’s increasingly callous stance.”

Furthermore, there are signs that the Home Office might start deporting people to the rest of Iraq as well, not only Kurdistan. Earlier this month, Sweden and Iraq signed a deal that will make it easier for Swedish authorities to deport Iraqi asylum seekers to Baghdad, “by force if necessary.” The deportation agreement was signed in Baghdad by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari and Swedish ambassador Niclas Trouve, according to the Swedish Justice Ministry. It is quite likely that the UK could follow suit in the near future.

‘Ethnic charter flights’

Using commercial flights to deport those who have been denied asylum is becoming increasingly embarrassing and costly for the government and the airline companies involved, due to successful campaigns and protests. To sustain the deportation regime, the UK government is increasingly resorting to ‘ethnic charter flights’, as campaigners call them. According to data obtained by NCADC under the Freedom of Information Act, there were 91 charter flights from the UK in the 16 months between February 2006 and May 2007 (see here). Besides Iraqi Kurdistan, the most frequent destinations included Eastern Europe (Operation Aardvark), Afghanistan (Operation Ravel) and DR Congo (Operation Castor) and Vietnam (Operation Naiad). More recently, there have also been charter flights to Jamaica, Nigeria and Sri Lanka.

Undertaking deportation charter flights also poses a ‘reputational risk’ for commercial airlines, although some seem utterly unmoved and unperturbed by such considerations. However, two years ago, XL Airways withdrew from a £1.5m contract with the Home Office following a number of protests highlighting the airline’s involvement in forced deportations to DR Congo (see here). Other airlines that are known to operate deportation charter flights from the UK and Ireland include Hamburg International, Channel Express, Air Partners and now, it seems, Czech Airlines.

Describing last week’s charter flight as “a crime”, IFIR’s Dashty Jamal said: “The Czech airline, the coach companies, Group 4, Serco, the detention centres, the Home Office and the Kurdistan Regional Government – all play a part in this and all should be condemned for playing with these peoples’ lives.”
 

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Oil giant Shell has recently won the Big Oil race to become the first major oil company to gain access to Iraq’s energy sector since the 1970s. With no competitive bidding process, the Dutch-British multinational has ‘won’ a $4bn contract to process and market natural gas with the South Gas Company in Basra.

The deal has been conducted in secret, leaving important information about the terms and authorship unknown. This secrecy has meant the contract was not subject to any public scrutiny or debate. Platform co-director Greg Muttitt surmised that “a country under occupation has introduced an oil policy that is favourable to western oil companies. The [US] State Department has already admitted that it has advisers working on oil policy and there is a likelihood they may have drafted the Shell contract.”

However, attempts to gain control over Iraq’s oil fields have not gone so well. As Corporate Watch reported last year (www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=2912), an oil law permitting de-facto oil privatisation was drafted under pressure from Big Oil, the US and UK governments, their consultants, and the IMF. It was presented to the Iraqi parliament in May 2007 and was expected to pass quickly. However, Iraqi and international opposition to transferring oil sovereignty to multinational oil companies has helped create a climate in which the Iraqi parliament has been able to resist the extreme pressure by US and UK governments and the has not been passed to date. So the big oil companies and governments are busy finding other avenues to the eventual prize of control over Iraq’s vast oil fields.

These avenues include discussing, preparing, and now bidding for contracts such as Risk Service Contracts (RSCs). While usually offering companies less in terms of long-term control over production and revenue than the prized Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), they can nonetheless be written to be very similar to PSCs. The devil is in the detail with these complex agreements, details which have not been disclosed. What is certain is that, if secured, they will represent a radical departure from traditional Iraqi – and indeed international – oil policy.

Risk Service Contracts, for instance, would still put private companies in charge of oil fields that are currently run by the public sector. Even the rejected draft Oil Law prescribed that those oil fields already producing oil would be run by the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). But this policy was reversed in June 2008 when the government announced that oil companies would be invited to bid for RSC contracts on six fields which collectively produce over 90% of Iraq’s current oil. They also offer far more control and profit to the oil companies than in any other major oil-producing country. They grant INOC a mere 25% stake, paltry in comparison with the average 80% demanded by the Libyan State Oil Company for new exploration contracts, for example, or with Nigeria’s National Petroleum Company, which is regarded as one of OPEC’s members most friendly to western companies, with a 55% stake in onshore projects.

These PSC-lite versions represent a desperate attempt by Big Oil to combat the resistance and to get their foot in the back door to Iraq’s massive oil reserves. At the same time, the US administration is battling to ratify the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in order to maintain the occupation beyond the end of 2008, when the UN Mandate expires. Rumours are circulating in Baghdad that this agreement will also include provisions allowing for the privatisation of the oil fields. While any agreement will not have the detail or the binding force of the Oil Law, the strategy seems to be to prolong the occupation to retain the political dominance to eventually get the privatisation they have been fighting for.

Of course, these attempts need coordination. On 13 October, 2008, Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani will meet with representatives of 41 international oil companies in London. This will be the formal launch of a round of bidding for some of Iraq’s largest oil fields, with the aim of signing long-term contracts in June 2009. The Iraqi Oil Ministry claims these deals will be for risk service contracts – in theory, a significant improvement over PSCs. But with such secrecy, it is impossible to know what the Iraqi government is signing away. What we do know is what the US and UK government, and Big Oil want, and the force – enabled by prolonging the occupation – that they will use to get it.

For more details, see Greg Muttitt’s recent articles at:

www.carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=332&parent=39, www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=28&id=2230&lang=0 and www.carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=333&parent=9.

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