Palestinians are calling for people internationally to take action against the companies complicit in Israel’s systematic demolition of Palestinian homes. This article focuses on British university partnerships with JCB, Caterpillar, HSBC and Volvo – four companies which are complicit in the home demolition policy. We also focus on six British universities:

• Sheffield Hallam University’s partnerships with JCB, Caterpillar and Volvo
• Warwick University’s partnership with JCB
• NMITE Hereford’s link to JCB
• Cambridge University’s links to Caterpillar
• Loughborough University’s partnerships with Caterpillar
• University College London Centre for Ethics and Law’s sponsorship from HSBC

In addition 27 UK universities hold investments in HSBC (either directly or indirectly), five invest in Caterpillar and four invest in Volvo.

Some of the information in this article is based on a database prepared by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, which details UK university investments and partnerships.

This article is written in support of the Palestinian movement for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israeli militarism, colonialism and apartheid. In particular, we hope this will serve as information for action for students taking part in the #ApartheidOffCampus day of action in the UK on November 27^th

Israel’s Home demolition policy

The Israel state carries out hundreds of demolitions of Palestinian homes and property every year.ⁱ Home demolitions are an integral part of the Israeli state’s continuing colonisation of Palestinian land. 461 demolitions were carried out in 2018 in the West Bank alone.ⁱⁱ

The pretexts given for home demolitions are varied, for example:

• The land which the homes is on has been declared ’state land’
• The homes are deemed too close to one of Israel’s expanding colonial settlements
• The state is carrying out collective punishment against the families of those suspected of being involved in resistance
• The owners of the homes are deemed not to have proper planning permission (planning permission is almost never granted to Palestinians. Since 2000 only 226 out of 5,475 applications by Palestinians for planning permission in the West Bank have been granted)
• The land that the homes are on has been deemed ‘agricultural land’, a national park, a site of archaeological interest, a military area or a ‘firing zone’ⁱⁱⁱ

But, whatever the reason given by the Israeli state for demolitions, the overriding motivation is always the same: To push Palestinian communities off the land, and to facilitate the growth of Israeli colonies.

Demolitions within Israel

Home demolitions are ongoing within Israel’s borders too. During 2018, the state demolished the entire village of Al Araqib in the Naqab desert in the south of Israel 13 times.^iv On each occasion they were met with steadfast resistance from the residents, and many of the demolished structures have since been rebuilt. In April 2018 the southern village of Um Al Hiran was ethnically cleansed and its structures demolished. It is to be replaced by a new Jewish-only community.^v

Call for international solidarity

In September 2018 thousands of Palestinians, along with Israeli and international supporters, were resisting the daily attempts to destroy the entire village of Khan Al Ahmar, a bedouin village close to the expanding settlement of Ma’ale Adumim. The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC) issued this call to action against the international companies taking part in the demolition:

“The Palestinian BDS National Committee calls for a global civil society effort for preventing the imminent destruction of Khan al-Ahmar. When campaigning for Khan Ahmar and other Palestinian communities at risk of destruction and forcible displacement, we urge everyone to… organize divestment and exclusion-from-tender campaigns against these companies in your trade union, church, university — or include these companies in existing campaigns — to raise the price of their complicity in egregious human rights violations.”

In July 2019, the Israeli state carried out demolitions on a massive scale in East Jerusalem, reportedly its largest act of ethnic cleansing since the military occupation of 1967.

The BNC wrote at the time:

“On Monday, Israel committed its biggest crime of ethnic cleansing since 1967, against the Palestinian neighborhood of Wadi Hummus in occupied East Jerusalem. In a military raid that began at dawn, Israeli soldiers destroyed, in just a few hours, the homes of hundreds of Palestinian families. This attack came almost immediately after an Israeli military court had authorized the demolitions. Another 116 homes are under imminent threat of demolition in Wadi Hummus.

The magnitude of the crime is not only its sheer scale.

If Israel’s aggressive home demolitions are not stopped now, other Palestinian communities will be next. In Jerusalem alone, at least one third of all Palestinian homes are at risk of demolition. This would mean the forcible displacement of some 100,000 Palestinians…

Israel’s ability to ethnically cleanse the indigenous Palestinian population of Jerusalem and to force Palestinians into Bantustans carved out by its illegal wall and settlements can be hampered by the mobilisation of people power.”

The BNC has specifically called for action against JCB, Volvo and Caterpillar.

The BDS movement is also calling for action against HSBC, as the company has substantial investments in Caterpillar.

Bedouin homes are demolished in Abu Nuwar in July 2018 (Photo by Corporate Occupation)

JCB

British company JCB manufactures civilian and military bulldozers which are used in Israel’s demolitions of Palestinian homes.^vi During 2018, Shoal Collective found that JCB machines were used in demolitions of 130 structures, including 2 schools. At least 163 people were made homeless including 31 children.^vii

JCB machines were also used in the Israeli demolitions which made thousands of people homeless in Wadi Hummus in July 2019.

Sheffield Hallam University’s partnerships with JCB

Sheffield Hallam University’s (SHU) website refers to JCB as a ‘partner’. The university advertises that it offers vocational apprenticeship programmes in collaboration with JCB. These apprenticeships have been ongoing since 2015. According to the SHU website “[JCB] have developed a number of successful higher and degree apprenticeships with us, delivering a number of benefits to their business”. The website gives a number of examples of student apprentices who have gone on to work at JCB.

These student apprenticeships are a way of JCB increasing its skills base, and are highly beneficial for the company. According to Nigel Ward, a manager for JCB “The advantage it brings to JCB is that we’re slightly ahead of the game in growing our own talent. We get a full spectrum of capabilities coming from an apprenticeship…”

The SHU website even boasts that its apprentices will have a say in “Designing the future of JCB”

SHU also advertises engineering courses which have been designed “in consultation” with JCB. This shows that JCB are able to shape SHU’s courses according to the company’s requirements.

Earlier this year, students at SHU made the following statement about SHU’s relationship with JCB and with other companies complicit in the occupation:

“Sheffield Hallam turns a blind eye any to an ethical framework when it comes to having ties with JCB, BAE Systems, Hewlett Packard, Rolls Royce, Volvo Trucks and Caterpillar. That’s why, following from the successful pass of a Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions policy at our Student Union in January 2019, we are on a mission to move beyond words into concrete actions to ensure students’ demands are heard, and their tuition fees are not used in forging such unethical collaborations and fueling more crimes against oppressed communities.”^viii

By running this apprenticeship programme in partnership with JCB, SHU is helping JCB with it’s recruitment of skilled workers. In continuing this programme, even when the complicity of JCB in Israel’s home demolitions has been pointed out to the university, SHU is showing complete disregard for the Palestinian communities which are being wrecked by the Israeli state’s home demolitions.

Warwick University’s joint projects with JCB

In 2017 Warwick University collaborated on a research project with JCB. A JCB engineer is quoted on an industry news website, boasting that the project helped JCB to develop their vehicles.

In collaborating with JCB on the project, Warwick University is ignoring the calls from Palestine to “raise the price” of JCB’s complicity in home demolitions.

NMITE Hereford

Britain’s newest university, the ‘New Model in Technology & Engineering’ (NMITE) Hereford has an ‘advisor’ from JCB.

Caterpillar

A soldier uses a Caterpillar military bulldozer to terrorise protesters in Kafr Qaddum.Photo by Mohamad Torokman.

US multinational company Caterpillar has become infamous for its support of the occupation. The company supplies D9 and D10 armoured military bulldozers, which are used in all of the Israeli military’s demolitions in the Gaza Strip.^ix

Caterpillar machines are also used in the Israeli state’s punitive home demolitions, where the military destroys the homes and property of the families of Palestinians suspected of involvement in resistance against the occupation.^x During 2018 Shoal Collective found that Caterpillar bulldozers were used in 7 punitive demolitions, and 86 invasions of the Gaza Strip.^xi Caterpillar machines were also used in at least three of the demolitions of the entire village of Al Araqib.^xii

Caterpillar bulldozers were used in the mass demolitions in Wadi Hummus in July 2019.

According to Shoal Collective:

“The D9 bulldozer is the Israeli military’s weapon of choice when carrying out its punitive demolitions, in contravention of international law. These demolitions are acts of collective punishment, aimed at wreaking vengeance on the families of Palestinians who are suspected of resistance.

Caterpillar’s non-military bulldozers are regularly used in Israel’s home demolitions in the West Bank, in settlement building and in working on Israel’s apartheid wall. They are also used to build roadblocks and checkpoints.”^xiii

Caterpillar and Sheffield Hallam University

Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) offers year long work placements with Caterpillar on some of its Automotive Engineering, Logistics&Supply Chain Management and Electrical&Electronic engineering courses. The university boasts that many of its graduates have gone on to work for the company.

Cambridge University

Cambridge University has partnered with Caterpillar through the Cambridge University Service Alliance (CUSA). The Alliance gives companies the ability to “influence and commission” research, as well as promote their brand.

While preparations were underway to destroy the entire village of Khan al Ahmar last Spring, CUSA were promoting Caterpillar’s participation in a trade conference in Dubai. As Caterpillar machines prepared the ground for the demolitions in August 2018, CUSA published an article about the unveiling of new research at Caterpillar’s premises in the UK.

Arms dealer BAE, which has sold weapons to Israel, and Cemex, which owns the company that provided cement for Israel’s apartheid wall have also been a part of Cambridge University Service Alliance.

Last year, 40 Cambridge University student groups signed a call for Cambridge to end its partnerships with BAE and Caterpillar. The statement reads:

“We, the undersigned, call on the University of Cambridge to immediately terminate its partnership with Caterpillar Inc. and BAE Systems, as part of the Cambridge Service Alliance. By maintaining this relationship, the University has made itself, and us, shamefully complicit in war crimes…

As highlighted by Human Rights Watch, Caterpillar Inc. supplies the militarized D9 bulldozers used by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to demolish thousands of Palestinian homes, making way for Jewish-only settlements.”

Loughborough University

The partnership between Loughborough University and Caterpillar has been ongoing since the 1990s. Loughborough University has been given “UK Partnership status” by the company and a high percentage of Caterpillar’s new graduate employees have historically been from Loughborough University.

According to research by Palestine Solidarity Campaign, “Loughborough University and Caterpillar UK Ltd have signed a partnership agreeing to collaborate on research to investigate new technologies for future Caterpillar products. The Caterpillar Innovation and Research Centre, part of Loughborough’s School of Aeronautical and Automotive Engineering, works closely with Caterpillar to develop new engineering processes and components.”^xiv

This close collaboration with Caterpillar makes Loughborough University deeply complicit in the war crimes being carried out with Caterpillar equipment in Palestine. There has been a high profile global campaign against Caterpillar’s role in the occupation since 2003, so the management of Loughborough University cannot claim not to know what their partner is up to. To continue the partnership shows complete disregard for the Palestinian people experiencing Israel’s racist home demolition policy.

The following UK universities hold investments in Caterpillar (either directly or through an investment fund):

• University of Manchester
• London School of Economics
• Royal Academy of Music
• University of Aberdeen
• University of Glasgowⁱ

Protest outside the HSBC AGM. Photo from bdsmovement.net

HSBC

HSBC is a major investor in Caterpillar. A coalition of UK based Palestine Solidarity groups is calling for HSBC to drop its investments in Caterpillar. According to the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, HSBC has “£100million worth of shares in Caterpillar, [whose] equipment is used to bulldoze Palestinian homes and build illegal settlements.”

University College London (UCL)

HSBC is a sponsor of the Centre for Ethics and Law at UCL. The centre claims that it “promotes and enhances collaboration between corporates, practitioners, civil servants, academics and others around the broad themes of professional ethics and the ethics of risk”

Arms dealer BAE Systems is also a sponsor of the Centre.

The following UK universities hold investments in HSBC (either directly or through an investment fund):

• Glasgow Caledonian University
• University of Strathclyde
• University of Leeds
• University of Manchester
• University of Reading
• University of Sheffield
• University of Stirling
• Plymouth Marjon University
• University College London
• Royal Holloway University of London
• Royal Academy of Music
• University of York
• University of Glasgow
• Lancaster University
• London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
• University of Dundee
• Newcastle University
• University of Surrey
• University of Central Lancashire
• University of Birmingham
• Coventry University
• University of Aberdeen
• Aberystwyth University
• University of Leicester
• The Institute of Cancer Research
• University of Derby
• London School of Economicsⁱ

A Volvo bulldozer demolishes a home in the South Hebron Hills in 2018

Volvo

According to Shoal Collective, Volvo machines were used in the demolition of at least 102 structure in the West Bank during 2018, including two schools. Volvo equipment was used by the Israeli state to destroy the entire village of Al Araqib eight times.^xv

Sheffield Hallam University (SHU)

Volvo Trucks is an industry partner of SHU, and several of its courses advertise that graduates have gone on to work for Volvo.

Volvo Trucks is part of Volvo Group (AB Volvo), which controls the manufacture of the bulldozers used in Israel’s home demolitions.^xvi

The following UK universities hold investments in Volvo (either directly or through an investment fund):

• London School of Economics
• University of Aberdeen
• University of Leicester
• The University of Glasgow ⁱ

Featured image is of Palestinians protesting demolitions in Khan al Ahmar in 2018, picture by Active Stills

Tom Anderson is part of Shoal Collective, and co-edits the Corporate Occupation website.

Footnotes:

The post The role of British universities in supporting Israel’s demolitions of Palestinian Homes appeared first on Corporate Watch.

Check Point Software Technologies sells internet security products across the world, including to public institutions such as the UK’s National Health Service. Israel’s fourth largest company, it is closely intertwined with the Israeli military and security services. Several of Check Point’s directors worked in cyber-intelligence for the Israeli military before starting careers in the private sector. The company works in partnership with some of Israel’s biggest arms companies, including drone manufacturer Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).

Like other parts of Israel’s hi-tech sector, such as the companies making a profit out of Israel’s drone industry, Check Point profits from the incubator provided by the Israeli state’s repression of Palestinians. The security forces that trained its directors are complicit in the mass imprisonment and assassination of those resisting colonisation.

This profile is written in solidarity with the Palestinian movement for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) of Israeli companies. The BDS movement calls for a boycott of Israeli companies, goods and products, and for international companies, funds and institutions to divest from and stop partnering with Israeli companies.

Company overview

Check Point is a massive Israeli IT security company with global reach. Established in Israel in 1993, the company provides “cyber security solutions” to both corporations and governments, describing itself as a “worldwide leader in securing the internet.” Check Point is known around the world for its firewall and VPN products.

Its global headquarters is located in Tel Aviv, with a US headquarters is in San Carlos, California. According to the Forbes business website, it is the fourth largest company in Israel (calculated in terms of revenue, net profits, total assets and market capitalisation). Its shares are traded publicly on the NASDAQ stock exchange in the US.

Check Point was one of many Israeli companies – including weapons manufacturing giant Elbit Systems – which saw its shares soar when Donald Trump came into power, as the company is expected to benefit from lucrative high-tech contracts connected to Trump’s militarist and pro-Israel policies

Check Point’s revenue reached $1.9 billion in 2018, and the company continues to grow: in recent years, it has completed a number of acquisitions of smaller businesses. In 2018, Check Point employed 2231 people in Israel, 1206 in the US, and 1633 in the rest of the world, making a total of 5070 employees.

Check Point paid $1.5 million in taxes on income to the Israeli government in 2018. At least some of that tax revenue will go towards propping up Israel’s occupation of Palestine.

The company is regularly in the news as a result of its press releases reporting various cyber attacks and for flagging up the vulnerabilities of popular apps, such as WhatsApp. It is not often reported that this security advice is being given by an Israeli company that has gained its experience through its closeness to Israel’s cyber intelligence agencies.

Who are its customers?

Most of Check Point’s customers are big corporations and governments, including a US state agency. In 2013, US business website Fast Company reported that:

“Check Point boasts that 100% of Fortune 100 firms and 98% of the Fortune 500 use their product. Government tenders are also a massive source of lucre for Check Point. This past month, Bloomberg’s Leslie Picker reported that up to 10% of Check Point’s North American profits come from the public sector. Ongoing federal government cybersecurity initiatives require federal agencies to obtain large-scale security contracts–and Check Point reportedly gets many of these.”

While the US is a major market for Check Point, the company is also active across Europe, Latin America, Asia, Australia and New Zealand.

Contracts with the public sector

Check Point markets its products to the public sector in the UK and other countries. Organisations using the company include at least one local council, a museum, as well as several universities and hospitals. For example, Denbighshire County Council in Wales chooses to use Check Point for its IT security. In recent years the company has been selling its security products to smaller businesses.

Britain’s National Health Service has provided 6,800 members of staff with Check Point SandBlast mobile phones. According to Check Point, “this technology safeguards mobile workers’ devices for NHS England.”

Check Point’s Directors

Gil Shwed is the co-founder and CEO of Check Point. He is Israel’s eighth richest billionaire, reportedly worth $4.7 billion. In 2018, Shwed won the Israel Prize, an award given out by the State of Israel. Education Minister Naftali Bennett announced Shwed as the winner, saying: “He paved the way and was an inspiration for me and thousands of Israeli high-tech entrepreneurs.”

Shwed and other top Check Point directors have strong ties to Israel’s military – the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). In particular, several have backgrounds in elite military intelligence units.

During his military service, Shwed served in the Israeli military’s Intelligence Unit 8200, which has similar functions to the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States. Both Intelligence Unit 8200 and the NSA are involved in cyber intelligence, in spying on on the population through the mass-collection of electronic data.

Dorit Dor is the Vice-President of Products at Check Point. She is listed as one of Forbes Israel’s most powerful women of 2019. Not just an enlisted soldier, Dor was a career cyber-spy spending eight years in the IDF. Like Shwed, Dor served in its Intelligence Unit 8200. She won the Israel Defense Prize in 1993. The award is presented by the President of Israel to those who, in the state’s eyes, make significant contributions to the defence of the state of Israel.

Marius Nacht also co-founded the company, and is currently Chairman of the Board. He has a net worth of $1.5 billion. He spent eight years in the Israeli Air Force, and was a graduate of the ‘Talpiot Program’, supposedly the IDF’s “most elite unit”. Talpiot accepts a small number of cadets every year, who are required to enlist for ten years and are taught advanced physics, mathematics and computer science, in order to develop technology and counter-intelligence programmes.

The Times of Israel describes Talpiot soldiers as having had “an impact on every weapon and communications system used by the IDF and every tool used by Israel’s intelligence community.” According to a book about the unit, Talpiots have “developed battle-ready weapons that only Israel’s top military officers and political leaders know about. They have also dramatically improved much of the weapons already in Israel’s arsenal.”

The cyber industry & its relationship with the Israeli government

The Israeli state’s regulatory system ensures that there is much collaboration between the government and private cyber companies like Check Point. In 1974, the Israeli government’s Ministry of Defense introduced encryption-control licensing legislation. Journalists Matthew Waxman and Doron Hindin explain what this means in practice:

“Israeli authorities are apprised of the latest encryption and cyber developments and position the government to engage effectively with the private sector when national security risks are identified.”

The Prime Minister’s department, the Israel National Cyber Directorate, also has the goal of “investing dedicated resources” in the cyber industry. The department “enhances the cooperation and synergy between the private sector, the government and international partners.” Check Point’s Gil Shwed regularly speaks at events which also host Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, as well as the Director General of the Israel National Cyber Directorate.

On top of this, most business people in Israel’s lucrative cyber industry have been trained in certain IDF units. As outlined above, Check Point’s Shwed and Dor served in Unit 8200, while Nacht served in the most elite unit of all. Waxman and Hindin say:

“Many high-tech innovators began their careers in Israeli military intelligence, and they continue to support former units as reservists. Israel’s small population and mandatory conscription policy further supports the reciprocal relationship between Israeli civilian business and its defense establishment. The Israel Defense Forces are also known to actively support their veterans’ economic success following discharge.”

Check Point and the Israeli arms industry

In 2016, Check Point teamed up with Israeli arms company, Israel Aerospace Industries, to form a consortium called IC3. Israeli Aerospace Industries is one of Israel’s largest weapons manufacturers, and its Heron drones have been used to terrorise people in Gaza. The company boasts that its weapons are “combat proven.” To read our report on IAI, click here.

The consortium, IC3, was established by the Israeli government’s Ministry of Economy, and was set up to “address technological-cyber needs at a national and governmental level.” The IC3 “offers end-to-end solutions for national cyber systems.” One key job that the IC3 has is to work with the government of Japan, preparing for the 2020 Olympics.

In November 2018, Check Point launched another consortium, IAC3, along with the Israeli government’s Economy Ministry, IAI and other companies. IAC3’s statement said that the consortium had been set up “to offer comprehensive, end-to-end cybersecurity solutions for the commercial aviation industry: airports, airlines and aircraft.”

Check Point’s close relationship with Tel Aviv University

Through the Checkpoint Institute for Information Security (CIIS), the company supports research into cyber security. It gives stipends to graduate students, provides post doctoral research fellowships, organises workshops and funds research projects.

CIIS is based at Tel Aviv University School of Computer Science, and Check Point has even provided a brand new building for the faculty.

The Palestinian BDS Movement has called for a boycott of Tel Aviv University. The BDS National Committee states that:

“For decades, Israeli universities have played a key role in planning, implementing and justifying Israel’s occupation and apartheid policies, while maintaining a uniquely close relationship with the Israeli military.

Tel Aviv University has developed tens of weapon systems. The university’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), boasts of having developed the “Dahiya doctrine” which advocates the use of disproportionate force by the Israeli military against Palestinian and Lebanese civilians.

Check Point’s Gil Shwed is a Tel Aviv University governor, and founded the CIIS. He is also on the board of trustees of the Tel Aviv University’s youth university.

UK universities investing in Check Point

A number of UK universities invest in Check Point, according to information obtained through Freedom of Information requests[1] these include:

• University of Aberdeen
• University of Bradford
• Imperial College London
• London School of Economics
• Royal Academy of Music
• Buckinghamshire New University

By investing in Israeli companies, these universities are supporting Israel’s continuing violations of human rights. Students across the UK are continually taking action at their universities to try to force the institutions to divest from the Israeli occupation.

The threat of BDS

Check Point admits in its 2018 annual report that the BDS movement is a threat to its business. The company states that:

“There have been increased efforts by activists to cause companies and consumers to boycott Israeli goods based on Israeli government policies. Such actions, particularly if they become more widespread, may adversely impact our ability to sell our products.”

Check Point is particularly vulnerable to boycott because its products are widely used by businesses and public service providers in the UK and other countries. For example, in the UK, BDS campaigns could:

• Call on the NHS not to sign any contracts or buy any products from Check Point in the future.
• Call on universities, local councils, hospitals and public institutions using Check Point’s technology not to renew any contracts or buy any products from Check Point in the future. (See here for a number of organisations which use Check Point technology.)
• Call on universities to end their investments in Check Point.
• Check Point gives cyber security training courses in authorised training centres all over the world. Campaigners could pressure the company’s training centre partners and urge them to stop providing Check Point courses. (For a list of training centres, see here.)

Subsidiaries

ZoneAlarm, SofaWare

Partners

Check Point has a number of partners, including Amazon, Google and Microsoft. To see the full list, click here.

Addresses

Check Point’s headquarters can be found at:

5 Shlomo Kaplan Street, Tel Aviv, 6789159, Israel;

959 Skyway Road Suite 300, San Carlos, CA 94070, United States

In North America, Check Point has offices in 19 US states and in Ontario, Canada.

It has an international presence in almost 40 other countries across Europe, Asia, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand.

Check Point’s London office can be found at:

Check Point Software Technologies (UK) Ltd
9th Floor, Moor Place
1 Fore Street
London EC2Y 5EJ

ukinfo@checkpoint.com
Tel: +44 (0) 203 608 7492

Check Point’s UK website, Check Point Direct, is delivered by its UK-based partner, NetThreat Limited. NetThreat can be found at Minerva Mill, Station Road, Alcester, B49 5ET.

Eliza Egret and Tom Anderson are part of Shoal Collective, and co-edit the Corporate Occupation website

Footnotes

[1] This data is based on responses to a series of Freedom of Information requests to UK universities made by Palestine Solidarity campaigners

The post Check Point Software: Ex-Israeli military spooks profiting from the cyber-security industry appeared first on Corporate Watch.

Elbit Systems, based in Haifa, is Israel’s largest privately-owned arms and ‘security’ company. Written to support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, this company profile looks in detail at how Elbit’s weapons have been used in Palestine and around the world, the shareholders and people at the top of the company and the resistance to its activities.

Contents

Recent expansion; Palestine; Syrian Golan; Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran; expanding “conflict zones”; the UK; the US/Mexico border; Georgia; Turkey; India; Philippines; Spain; Switzerland; Brazil; the EU; Links with Israeli universities; Company overview and finances; Employees; Subsidiaries; Addresses; Ownership; Products; Manufacturing; Shippers; Drones; Major corporate partners; Arms fairs; Resistance; Call for increased action; Background to drone technology

Recent expansion

Elbit is growing fast. It has absorbed dozens of companies since 2000 and now employs over 12,700 people as well as presiding over a considerable global network of over 80 subsidiaries and affiliated corporations.ⁱ

Elbit provides up to 85% of the land-based equipment procured by the Israeli militaryⁱⁱ and about 85% of it’s dronesⁱⁱⁱ but it is also a company with international reach – 80% of its market is outside Israel.^iv The company has military contracts with governments in the US, UK and Europe, Africa, Asia and South America. It manufactures most of its equipment in Israel, the US, Europe and Brazil.

Elbit has been busy buying up competing businesses over the last eight years, purchasing Israeli arms companies NICE Systems, Tadiran, Elisra and Soltam Systems.^v In August 2018, the Israeli state regulator approved Elbit’s purchase of the previously state-owned IMI Systems for $520 million.^vii IMI is the sole supplier of small calibre ammunition to the Israeli military. It has a workforce of over 3,000^ix people and sold $330 million of weapons to the Israeli army in 2016. Elbit sold equipment worth $610 million in the same year. The purchase of IMI, which has now been completed, will dramatically increase Elbit’s size and make it one of the largest suppliers of weapons to the Israeli military, accounting for an estimated 30% of all weapons.^x

Elbit also opened an office in Berlin in 2018^xi and bought US company Universal Avionics Systems, which has three premises in the US and one office in Switzerland. Elbit CEO Bezhalel Machlis stated that the company is keen on expanding even more. He told Reuters: “Our target markets are the United States, Europe, Australia…We are continuing to look for acquisitions.”^xii

The company is funding its massive global expansion by borrowing more from banks and the financial markets, perhaps hoping that the Israeli state will bail it out if things go wrong.^xiii

Palestinian civil society call for action

The Palestinian boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) National Committee, the committee of representatives of over 150 civil society organisations that made the call for BDS, sees Elbit as a key target and is calling for protests and divestment campaigns against the company. A statement on their website reads:

“Israel is only able to act with such impunity because governments and companies around the world cooperate with its military and with its military companies. Palestinian civil society has called for a comprehensive and immediate military embargo on Israel. BDS campaigning is starting to have an impact on Israeli military companies such as Elbit Systems.”^xiv

Elbit and Israel’s drone wars

About 85% of drones used by the Israeli military are manufactured by Elbit.^xv Elbit’s armed drones are used by the Israeli army in daily surveillance and attacks in Gaza^xvi In effect, Elbit markets its equipment with the fact that it has been battle tested on people in Gaza. For example, the Elbit website advertises the Hermes 450 drone as “combat proven” and the “primary platform of the IDF in counter-terror operations”.^xvii

The Israeli military still does not openly acknowledge its use of armed drones to carry out strikes in Gaza.^xviii However, Israel’s use of drones to conduct assassinations is well documented by grassroots groups,^xix NGOs and cables disclosed by Wikileaks. Drones are also used for surveillance, reconnaissance and to acquire targets for piloted planes to attack.^{xx xxi}

In 2016, The Intercept revealed that since 2008 UK and US intelligence agencies had been tapping into Israeli drone video feeds, including Elbit’s Hermes drones. The feeds appeared to show that some of the drones were carrying missiles.^xxii There is now substantial evidence that both the Hermes 450 and Hermes 900 drones have been deployed and armed by the Israeli military.^xxiii

The use of drone technology has changed the nature of modern warfare, enabling governments to launch attacks without any need for boots on the ground or a declaration of war. Accordingly, drones provided by Elbit and other companies have been used by the Israeli military to carry out assassinations in Sudan and Egypt at times when Israel was not officially ‘at war’ with those countries. They have also been used to spy on people in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon (see below).

Use of Elbit’s equipment in Gaza

Elbit’s Hermes drones were one of the two main unpiloted aircraft used to attack people in Gaza during Israel’s 2009 Operation Cast Lead attack, which killed over 1,400 Palestinians. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW):

“The Hermes can stay aloft for up to 24 hours at altitudes of up to 18,000 feet and has an array of optical, infra-red, and laser sensors that allow the operator to identify and track targets as well as to guide munitions in flight. The Hermes carries two Spike-MR (medium range) missiles.”^xxiv

HRW reports that the Hermes drone is equipped with a camera system which allows the drone pilot to see if a person is armed and if they are a child or an adult. The drone’s missiles are also equipped with cameras and can be diverted up to the last second. This means that Israel’s drone pilots and their commanders would have known that they were targeting civilians and may be culpable for war crimes carried out by Elbit drones. HRW has also called for the disclosure of camera footage shot by Hermes drones to assist in the investigation of war crimes. Needless to say, this request has not been granted.^xxv

Elbit Hermes drone. Photo: Matthieu Sontag, Licence CC-BY-SA

The assassination of Hamas commander Ahmed Jabari – the start of Israel’s 2012 Pillar of Cloud assault on Gaza – was carried out by an Elbit Hermes 450 drone, according to Defence Today.^xxvi

Elbit’s 7.5 Skylark mini-UAV, operational in the Israeli Army since 2008, was heavily used for support of ground military actions in Israel’s 2014 attack on Gaza, Operation Protective Edge, which killed 2,202 Palestinians. The Hermes 450s and 900s were also used throughout this attack.

At the time, Elbit’s CEO confirmed to Israeli media that “all [Elbit products] were in operational use by the IDF in the recent fighting and proved themselves.”^xxviii

During Israel’s 2014 attack on Gaza, four young children were killed after an Israeli drone, operated remotely by soldiers from the Palmachim air base in Israel, targeted them while playing on a beach. The drone’s operators claimed that they mistook the four Palestinian cousins, all aged 10 or 11, for “Hamas militants”. An Israeli police report seen by The Intercept shows that, at about 3.30pm, the operators of an Israeli Hermes 450 drone captured footage of the boys. An Israeli air force commander then ordered the operators of a second drone to fire, killing one of the boys. After firing the first missile, the operators of the second drone pursued the rest of the boys, and reportedly radioed for orders as to whether to carry out a second strike in a civilian area. They did not receive an order but fired anyway. The two missile strikes killed the four boys and injured 4 others. All the boys were from the Bakr family. The family has launched a legal case in an attempt to get justice.^xxix

During the investigation into the murder of the Bakr boys, the drone operators claimed that they “couldn’t tell they were children”. If this is true, then it brings into question the quality of the video-feed from the Elbit drone.^xxx

The use of Elbit’s drones in war crimes leads to more business for the company. A year after Elbit’s Hermes 900 was introduced to the skies of Gaza, the Israeli military ordered an upgrade of the drone. Elbit also took orders for the Hermes 900 from Switzerland and a “Latin American client”, according to the Jerusalem Post.^xxxi

West Bank Apartheid Wall

Elbit is one of the main providers of the electronic detection fence system for the West Bank apartheid Wall.^xxxii The wall has been ruled illegal by the International Criminal Court.^xxxiii

Arrests in the West Bank

The Elbit Skylark drone was used during multiple house arrests by the Israeli military in the West Bank in 2014.^xxxiv

Elbit’s purchase of IMI and the massacres of Palestinian protesters.

Last year, Israel’s antitrust regulators approved Elbit’s purchase of IMI Systems, the sole supplier of small calibre ammunition to the Israeli military. The sale has now gone through.

Since March 2018, protesters in Gaza have been holding demonstrations at the apartheid wall separating them from Israel under the banner of the “Great March of Return”. Israeli troops routinely open fire with live ammunition. At the time of writing over 183 people have been killed, and over 10,391 people injured^xxxv while attending the protests.

In June 2018, Corporate Occupation researchers found an IMI Systems bullet at the Nahal Oz military base close to where soldiers were firing at the March of Return protests.

Strangling Gaza with Walls

Elbit is currently involved in the Israeli Ministry of Defence’s project to construct an extra hi-tech barrier around the Gaza Strip, fortifying the current barrier that besieges Gazans.

The company is already trying to increase its profits from its experience of intensifying Israel’s siege of Gaza. According to Who Profits, Elbit is urging the Israeli government to allow it to export the tunnel detection system that it developed for the Israeli military to use.^xxxvi

Deadly ghost ships

Elbit’s products also include^xxxvii armed remote control boats, capable of launching torpedoes.^xxxviii Palestinian fishermen have told Corporate Occupation researchers that they have been attacked by similar unpiloted boats off the shores of Gaza.

Elbit’s unpiloted boats were showcased^xxxix at the Singapore airshow in 2016 and have been deployed in NATO training exercises in 2018.^xl GRSE, a company owned by the Indian state, is partnering^xli with Elbit on an Unmanned Surface Vehicle project.

The Israeli occupied Syrian Golan

In 2010, Corporate Watch researchers found that Elbit had premises in the settlement of Bnei Yehuda, on land taken from Syrians by military force in 1967. The settlement is illegal under international law.^xlii

Israeli attacks in Sudan and Egypt

In 2009 Hermes 450 drones were used in an attack on a convoy in Sudan, which was reportedly bearing arms bound for Gaza.^xliii

There is growing evidence of Israeli Hermes drones supporting Egypt’s attacks against Islamist and anti-state groups in the Northern Sinai peninsula. In 2012, Elbit Hermes 450 drones were involved in an assassination in North Sinai.^xliv In 2013, a Hermes 450 malfunctioned while flying “close to the Egyptian border”. The military claim that it was intentionally crashed on the Israeli side of the border.^xlv In 2017 an Israeli drone strike killed one person in Rafah.^xlvi In August 2018, anonymous sources within the Egyptian army told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz that Israeli drones had carried out an attack killing five people in Rafah, on the Egyptian side of the border.^xlvii It is not clear if Elbit’s equipment was used in these two later attacks but the company clearly sees the situation in the Sinai as an opportunity for increased profits. Elad Ahronson, an executive at Elbit, referred to the Sinai Peninsula in an interview about Elbit’s products with industry press in 2015.^xlviii

Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran

Elbit’s Hermes 450 drones were used intensively during Israel’s 2006 attack on Lebanon.

In April 2018, an armed Israeli Hermes 450 drone, manufactured by Elbit, crashed in Southern Lebanon. Eyewitnesses reported that a second drone fired a missile at the crashed drone, partially destroying it, presumably to prevent anyone retrieving data from it. The Israeli military released a statement that the drone belonged to them.^xlix The Elbit drone was reportedly armed with four Israeli-made Mikholit missiles.^l

The Israeli military has deployed Hermes 900 drones close to the Israel/Syria border.^li In 2017, an Elbit-manufactured Skylark mini-drone was shot down by pro-Assad forces in Syria over the city of Quneitra.^lii Earlier that year, a strike by an unidentified Israeli drone had killed a pro-Assad militia commander in Southern Syria.^liii

In 2014, it was reported that an Israeli Hermes drone was shot down close to Baghdad Airport in Iraq. The Israeli military refused to confirm or deny the story.^liv

Elbit’s drones are also key to the two-way espionage taking place between Israel and Iran. An Elbit Hermes 450 drone was shot down in 2014 in Iran, close to a uranium enrichment facility.^lv Shooting down the drone may have helped Iran’s own drone industry, which has developed drones based on the Hermes.^lvi

Elbit claims that its large Hermes 900 StarLiner drone is well suited to attacks on far-away “targets” such as Iran and Syria.^lvii

Pushing the boundaries of “conflict zones”

In 2018, Elbit showcased a version of the Hermes 900 drone designed to fly in civilian airspace, alongside civilian planes. “Some customers would like to use the system to gather intelligence,” Elbit CEO Bezhalel Machlis said. “Another example can be for homeland security applications, to fly above an area and make sure it is monitored against terrorist activities.” Press reports at the time of writing say that “Elbit expects to receive approval from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) for its own product in the coming months.”^lviii Of course, this may well be PR spin. If true, it would mean that drones developed besieging and attacking Gaza might become used routinely on a global scale by states spying on their own populations.

Elbit’s deals and partnerships around the world

The UK

Elbit leased Hermes 450 drones to the UK armed forces, through French company Thales,^lix for use in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2007-14. These drones reportedly flew over Afghanistan for at least 86,000 hours.^lx

The UK has also used Hermes 450 drones over Afghanistan and deployed its new Watchkeeper drone, based on the Hermes 450 (see below). Canada has also purchased Elbit Skylark drones for use in Afghanistan.^lxi

In 2005, the UK announced that it would buy new drones based on the Hermes 450 design. As a result, Elbit formed the U-TacS partnership (of which it owns a 51% stake) with French company Thales to supply 54 Watchkeeper drones to the Ministry of Defence. Although, on the face of it, the Watchkeeper is a reconnaissance drone, it has been displayed in several arms fairs bearing missiles. There is no evidence, however, that the UK has deployed it armed.

Engines for the Watchkeeper are being produced at Elbit’s UAV engines factory in Shenstone, Staffordshire. British soldiers have travelled to Israel to undergo training as part of the Watchkeeper programme. Testing is carried out from ParcAberporth in West Wales and Boscombe Down in Wiltshire.^lxii However, during the winter of 2015, the MOD moved the Watchkeeper programme to the mid-Atlantic British colony of Ascension, citing better weather.^lxiii Avoiding public scrutiny may also have played a part.

Elbit protest

A Watchkeeper drone was first deployed in Afghanistan in 2014. But the deployment was more a sales pitch for U-TacS than of any operational benefit. The French military, potential buyers of the Watchkeeper, were invited to watch the flight from Camp Bastion, and the drone has since been advertised as combat-proven.

However, in 2016 the French military chose to buy a Sagem drone instead of the Watchkeeper.^lxiv The decision was probably due to the severe delays and crashes which have occurred in the UK Watchkeeper programme, as well as campaigning by BDS activists in France.^lxv

The Watchkeeper is also now a little outdated, as it requires the operator to be relatively close by, compared to the US’ Predator and Reaper drones.

In 2018, a Watchkeeper crashed in Ceredigon, West Wales, the fifth drone so far to have crashed. Local residents are concerned over safety and almost £30m has been wasted.^lxvi The Watchkeeper programme, in a surprise Israeli contribution to the UK anti-war movement, has cost the Ministry of Defence (MOD) more than £1bn over the last 12 years but has translated to only 146 hours of use on operations.

In response to a parliamentary question in 2018, the MOD stated that it had received delivery of 45 out of 54 of the Watchkeeper dronesordered, meaning that nine remain to be delivered, five years past the delivery date. Five of those 45 drones crashed during tests.^lxvii

All of this has not been a particularly good advert for U-TacS and Elbit. However, this doesn’t seem to have stopped Elbit from starting fresh partnerships in the UK aimed at getting more MoD contracts.

Perhaps to deal with all this potential bad press, as well as criticisms from BDS activists, Elbit has enlisted the services of a UK based PR/Strategy consultancy called TWC Associates which has links to the Conservative party.^lxviii

Since 2016, Elbit has run a joint venture called Affinity Training with US company KBR. Affinity has a flight training school at RAF Cranwell in Lincolnshire in the UK, partnering with the MoD to train British pilots.^lxix Affinity’s contract with the MoD is worth £500m over 18 years.^lxx

In 2017, the company also entered into an agreement with Babcock International, a British multinational, to establish a joint company to deliver another training programme to the MoD.^lxxi The plan is to deliver outsourced training to the air force over a fifteen year period.^lxxii

The MoD’s repeated deals with Elbit are a direct support to Israel’s military industrial complex.

Ferranti, one of Elbit’s UK subsidiaries, is running a PR campaign in Oldham. They are participating at events in Oldham’s Mahdio Centre, where students are encouraged to spend time talking to the company about “careers”. Ferranti’s website boasts that they gave out free “stress balls and sweeties”.

US and the Mexico border wall

Elbit has been working with the Department of Homeland Security since 2006.^lxxiii In 2014 it used its experience providing electronics to the West Bank and Gaza apartheid walls to win a contract with the US to develop surveillance towers on Arizona’s border with Mexico. The $145m contract, awarded to Elbit’s US subsidiary, was intended to “be able to detect a single, walking, average-sized adult’ at a range of five miles”.^lxxiv

Elbit border security. Photo:www.elbitsystems.com

In 2017, the Trump administration awarded Elbit a contract to work on the expansion of the Mexico border wall. The Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC) called for mutual solidarity with grassroots movements in the US and Mexico, saying: “When we Palestinians see how the escalating militarization of the Mexico/U.S. border obstructs migrants’ right to freedom of movement, we recall how Israel’s intense militarization of the occupied West Bank also restricts Palestinian freedom of movement.”^lxxv

Some of the towers are now operational. George Kesting of Elbit Systems of America said: “The [border control] agents are able to… use the system with the cameras to see what the activity is in detail that’s coming at them”.^lxxvi The company is now searching for new opportunities to exploit the state control of people’s movement along the border.^lxxvii

Since its acquisition of IMI, Elbit/IMI is also providing weapons systems for use with US Bradley Fighting vehicles.^lxxviii

Georgia

Georgia used Hermes 450 drones to its advantage in its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. Russia responded by buying its own Israeli drones, manufactured by Elbit competitor IAI.^lxxix

Turkey

Turkey’s president Erdoğan is trying to position himself as an opponent of Israel’s siege of Gaza, while oppressing Kurds and imposing his own occupation and siege on Rojava. Despite announcing short-lived military embargoes, Turkey has not answered Palestinian civil society calls to boycott Israeli arms. Elbit’s Joseph Ackermann boasted in 2011 that the political situation between the two countries had had “no effect” on Elbit.^lxxx Campaign Against the Arms Trade reports that Elbit made applications annually to export weapons to Turkey from it’s factories in the UK from 2010 to 2015.^lxxxi It is possible that the exports were made via the UK to avoid sparking political controversy between Israel and Turkey, which have both sporadically imposed embargoes on each other since 2010.^lxxxii

India

In 2018, Elbit began a joint venture with India’s Adani to set up a drone production plant in Hyderabad.^lxxxiii Adani is already the target of a mass movement in Australia because of their plan to build one of the world’s biggest coal mines on First Nations peoples’ lands. If completed, the mine would contribute significantly to global climate change, and ships exporting coal to India would devastate the Great Barrier Reef.^lxxxiv

Philippines

In 2014, the Philippines government signed a $20M deal with Elbit for 28 Israeli upgraded armored personnel carriers (APCs), to be delivered in 2015. The BNC and Phillipino socialist party Akbayan made the following statement:

“We urge Congress to join Akbayan, the BNC and the people of Palestine in calling upon the government to scrap the deal with Elbit Systems. Certainly, the modernization of the Philippine military must not come at the expense of the lives of innocent Palestinian people and peace in Palestine and Israel. We plan to propose cancellation of this unacceptable arms deal during the coming budget briefing of the Department of National Defense.”^lxxxv

Spain

In 2011, Elbit won an $8.5m contract to supply mortars to the Spanish army over a 12 month period.^lxxxvi

Switzerland

In 2014, Armasuisse, the Swiss military procurement agency, awarded Elbit a $280m contract for Hermes 900 drones. This came after Israel’s 2012 bombardment of Gaza, where more people were killed by drones than by any other weapon. The delivery contract extends over 5 years until 2020.^lxxxvii Swiss drones had previously been provided by Elbit’s rival, IAI.

Brazil

Brazil used Hermes 450s and 900s for surveillance during the 2014 world cup. Elbit has a network of subsidiaries and manufacturing plants in the country.^lxxxviii However, due to the efforts of campaigners in pressuring the previous Worker’s Party government, Elbit had difficulties operating in Brazil (see resistance section below). In 2015, Israeli business website The Marker wrote that “political reasons” led to a de facto freeze of military transactions with Brazil – a development that was particularly painful for Elbit Systems.^lxxxix

This situation appears to have changed since the 2016 removal of Workers Party president Dilma Rousseff In 2017 Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary, Ares, signed a new contract to provide remotely controlled weapons systems to Brazil’s armed forces.

Elbit and the EU

Elbit receives generous grants from the European Union under its Horizon 2020 research programme.^xc The company benefited from involvement in five European projects under the Seventh Framework Programme for research and technological development. Palestinians have called^xci on the EU to end all of its dealings with Elbit and other Israeli arms companies. According to Palestinian campaign group Stop the Wall:

“The issue at stake is not the project itself but the contribution by the EU tax money to the company’s solvency. These projects de facto are a subsidy to the company, including its production of drones and weapons and technology for the Wall and the settlements.”^xcii

In 2017, according to Electronic Intifada, Elbit had received almost $6 million in European taxpayer money as part of Horizon 2020 and other EU research funding streams. Campaigners have pointed out that these grants are being made despite the fact that Elbit does not ensure that its weapons are not used with cluster munitions, something the EU is now obliged to do under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Elbit and Europe’s attacks on migrants

In 2013-14 Elbit was involved in talks with The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, then known as Frontex, about how its Hermes 900 drones can be used for surveillance of migrants.^xcv Frontex, however, now appears to be favouring Elbit’s competitors, Israeli Aerospace Industries and Leonardo.

Links with Israeli universities

Israeli universities are deeply enmeshed with the Israeli arms industry. Students at Haifa’s Technion have been awarded grants to access an Elbit research laboratory, while the chairman of the board of governors at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem is Michael Federmann, who also chairs the board at Elbit.^xcvi

Elbit is also seeking new partnerships with international universities. In 2017, Elbit announced new partnerships with the Metropolitan State University in Minnesota and Regent University in Virginia.^xcvii

Company overview

Industry: Manufacture of military, security and surveillance equipment. Unpiloted drones, military and naval weapons, flight training and simulation, medical instruments.^xcviii

Traded on: NASDAQ (ESLT) | TASE

Revenues/profits: In 2017 the company reported revenues of $3.37bn and a net income of $239m.^xcix To see the latest annual report click here.^c The company has increased its revenues over the last ten years. During that period, the Israeli army has used their equipment in three major attacks on Gaza.

Employees: Over 12,700^ci (mostly in Israel and the US)

Subsidiaries:^cii

Israeli subsidiaries: Elop, Elisra SCD. Cyberbit, Semi-Conductor Devices (Also owned by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems) and Opgal (50%). Elbit Systems Land and C4, Elbit Security Systems, Cyclone, ELSEC, Kinetics, ITL Optronics, SCD (50%), Tor (50%)

US subsidiaries: Elbit Systems of America, Merrimack Operations (Kollsman Inc), EFW, KMC Systems, Fort Worth Operations, International Enterprises, Talladega Operations (IEI), Mclean Operations (ICI), San Antonio Operations (M7), M7 Aerospace, Real Time Laboratories, Boca Raton Operations, VSI and RCEVS.

Elbit Systems of America (ESA), wholly owned by Elbit, is a contractor for the US Foreign Military Sales Programme and has a special security arrangement with the US Department of Defense allowing them access to classified data.^ciii

ESA’s subsidiary KMC is involved in the manufacture of medical instruments used by healthcare providers, and ESA is involved in manufacturing communications equipment for police and emergency services.

Canada: GeoSpectrum Technologies^civ

Australia: Elbit Systems of Australia

India: Halbit

South Korea: SESA

Brazil: Ares, AEL

UK subsidiaries: UAV Engines (UEL), Ferranti Technologies, Elite KL, Instro Precision, UTacS

Other European subsidiaries: Elbit (Belgium) and Elbit (Romania), Telefunken RACOMs (Germany), Elbit (Austria)

Addresses

In the UK:

Ferranti Technologies, Cairo House, Greenacres Road, Waterhead, Oldham, Lancashire, OL4 3JA, http://www.ferranti-technologies.co.uk/,

View on Campaign Against the Arms Trade’s interactive map.

Ferranti’s website advertises naval, air and ground systems including head-mounted displays for armoured fighting vehicles and power supplies for military aircraft.^cv

UAV Engines Ltd, Lynn Lane, Shenstone, Lichfield, WS14 0DT, View

UAV Engine’s website advertises engines for drones.^cvi In 2010 UAV Engines applied for two military export licences to Israel for engines for drones. The UK government has previously claimed that equipment provided by this firm has “only been issued for the engines to be incorporated in Israel and then exported.” However, doubt has been cast on this claim by many commentators, including Amnesty International.^cvii

Elite KL, Sandy Way, Amington Industrial Estate, Tamworth, Staffordshire, B77 4DS, http://www.elitekl.co.uk/military/, View

Elite KL’s website advertises military cooling systems.^cviii

Instro Precision, 15 Hornet Close, Pysons Road Industrial Estate, Broadstairs, Kent, CT10 2YD, http://www.instro.com, View

Instro’s website advertises camera systems for surveillance and target acquisition.^cix

Instro are in the process of moving to a new premises. The new address will be Discovery Park Site North East, Ramsgate Road, Sandwich, CT13 9ND. It is anticipated that this address will eventually replace the Broadstairs address.

Elbit’s Headquarters:

Advanced Technology Center, POB 539, Haifa 31053, Israel.

Company website: elbitsystems.com

Ownership

As of late September 2018, Elbit is controlled by the Federmann Family through Federmann Enterprises (46%). Other major investors are Psagot Investment House, FMR, Invesco, Gilder Gagnon Howe & Co, Renaissance Technologies, Altshuler Shaham, Delek Group, Vanguard Group and Deutsche Bank.^cx

The Canadian Public Sector Pension Investment Board, the Bank of Montreal and Royal Bank of Canada also hold shares.^cxi

Two UK High Street banks, HSBC and Barclays, have historically been listed as shareholders in Elbit. Both banks own shares on behalf of their clients through stockbroker services which facilitate the buying and selling of shares. While the decision to buy or sell the shares remains with the banks’ clients, banks could take the ethical stance of excluding Elbit and other arms companies from their platforms.

In 2015, campaigners celebrated that Barclays was no longer listed as a shareholder in Elbit.^cxii However, at the time of writing, Barclays was again listed as a shareholder in the company on NASDAQ.^cxiii

HSBC announced that it had divested from Elbit in late 2018 (see below).

A full list of Elbit’s investors can be found here.

Products manufactured by Elbit

Drones, helmet mounted display systems, display and weapons systems for Apache helicopters, rockets and guidance systems, fuel tanks for F-16s, unpiloted boats, systems for civil aviation, remote control turrets for armoured personnel carriers, artillery systems, systems to control firing from tanks, remote control ground vehicles, radio and satellite systems, electronic fence systems, thermal imaging cameras, satellite technology for space programmes, systems for Bradley fighting vehicles, flight simulators, medical instruments.^cxiv

Manufacturing: Elbit says it manufactures the majority of its products in the US, Israel, Europe, India and Brazil.^cxv

Shippers: US shipping firm APL and Maersk, a Danish shipping conglomerate, have both transported Elbit products in the past.^cxvi In 2018, Seamax Shipping, based in Dubai, transported a consignment from Elbit Israel to Triumph Aerostructures in the US.^cxvii

Drones currently manufactured by Elbit:^cxviii

Skylark I Lex mini-UAS; Skylark II, Skylark 3, Skylark C (for naval use)

DA-VINCI Multi-Rotor Mini-UAS

Hermes 90

Hermes 180

Hermes 450

Hermes 900

Hermes 1500 (with Israeli company Silver Arrow)^cxix

Watchkeeper WK450 (as part of the U-TacS partnership with Thales)

Seagull unpiloted boat

The Hermes 450 and 900 have been used to carry out attacks by the Israeli air force.^cxx

Elbit also produces the Skystriker suicide drone, a cross between a missile and a drone.^cxxi

Countries Elbit has exported drones to:^cxxii

Argentina (joint partnership)

UK

USA

Philippines

Azerbaijan

Botswana

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Croatia

Czech republic

France

Canada

Uruguay

Sweden

Hungary

Macedonia

Netherlands

Poland

Slovakia

South Korea

Australia

Canada

Georgia

Italy (joint venture)

Mexico

Singapore

South Africa

Uzbekistan

Thailand^cxxiii

Switzerland (to be delivered in 2019)^cxxiv

Major corporate partners

Babcock (UK),^cxxv Thales (France),^cxxvi KBR (US),^cxxvii Rockwell Collins (US),^cxxviii Embraer (Brazil),^cxxix Kraken (Canada),^cxxx GRSE (India),^cxxxi Boeing (US),^cxxxii Adani (India),^cxxxiii General Dynamics (US),^cxxxiv Ashok Leyland (India).^cxxxv

Participation in arms fairs

Elbit regularly promotes itself at international weapons exhibitions including DSEI (London), Land Forces (Australia), MSPCO Kielce (Poland), ADAS (Philippines), Paris Air Show (France), Farnborough Airshow (UK), Singapore Airshow (Singapore), ADEX Baku (Azerbaijan), BIDEC (Bahrain), Eurosatory (France), IDEF (Turkey)^cxxxvi, DefExpo (India).^cxxxvii

Resistance

Since the Palestinian civil society call for boycott, divestment and sanctions was made in 2005, there has been a divestment campaign against Elbit. The Norwegian state pension fund, leading Danish bank Danske Bank, Dutch pension giant ABP, the Swedish AP pension fund and Folksam have all divested their shares.^cxxxviii Investment experts have told campaigners that Elbit now appears on most blacklists prepared by ‘socially responsible’ investment research companies.

Barclays is the only European high street bank to appear on the list of institutional shareholders investing in Elbit published by NASDAQ.com. This suggests that most European banks believe that the company’s role in Israeli war crimes make it an inappropriate investment.

In 2011 a Palestinian civil society call demanded a two way embargo on arms sales to and from the Israeli state and Israeli companies.^cxxxix Anti-militarist campaigners have targeted Elbit in line with this call and launched campaigns calling for investors to divest their shares from the company.

The campaign has gathered momentum since the Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2014. During the attack, activists occupied the roof of Elbit’s UK subsidiary in Shenstone, closing the factory for 48 hours. A similar occupation was held in Australia.^cxl Demonstrations continue to be held at Elbit’s factory in Shenstone.

In response to the 2014 massacre, social movements and trade unions in Brazil pressured the government of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul to end a collaboration deal with Elbit. The state government eventually agreed to cancel the contract, citing ethical concerns. The cancelled plans included a $17m project to build military satellites.^cxli

In 2016, the Brazilian Ministry of Defence, then headed by a member of the pro-Palestinian Communist Party of Brazil, refused to approve funds to a drone research and development project with Elbit. Elbit was forced to abandon the project, and later closed down Harpia Sistemas, the company’s joint venture with Brazilian company Embraer.^cxlii

Campaigners in Wales have been protesting for years against the testing of the Watchkeeper drones at ParcAberporth in West Wales.^cxliii

Activists also held an intensive campaign calling for Barclays to divest from Elbit, holding pickets, blockades, occupations and demonstrations at Barclays branches. In a day of action in November 2014, 15 simultaneous actions were held against Barclays branches across the UK. In 2015, campaigners celebrated as Barclays divested their shares.^cxliv However, in 2018 Barclays were again listed as a shareholder in Elbit on NASDAQ.^cxlv

A successful divestment campaign took place against HSBC, calling on them to stop their clients from buying shares in Elbit through their investment platform. In July 2017, campaigners held demonstrations at HSBC branches in Brighton, Manchester and London, dubbing it “the world’s lethal bank”^cxlvi Protests were also held at HSBC’s 2018 AGM and a further day of action was held at HSBC branches across the UK in September.^cxlvii

Brighton PSC Protest

Ryvka Bernard of War On Want said:

“HSBC has taken a positive first step in divesting from Elbit Systems, the notorious manufacturer of drones, chemical weapons, cluster bomb artillery systems, and other technology used in attacks against Palestinian civilians, and to militarise walls and borders around the world. Doing business with companies like Elbit means profiting from violence and human rights violation, which is both immoral and a contravention of international law.

“However, HSBC continues to do business with over a dozen companies selling military equipment and technology used in human rights violation, including Caterpillar, whose bulldozers are used in demolition of Palestinian homes and properties, and BAE Systems, whose weapons are used in war crimes by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other repressive regimes. Until it ends its support for companies arming repression, the campaign will continue!”.

Blockades, demonstrations, occupations

The bi-annual DSEI arms fair held in London, where Elbit is a regular exhibitor, meets with resistance currently organised by the Stop the Arms Fair coalition. 2017 saw the biggest mobilisation for many years, with thousands of people attempting to block the weapons exhibitors from getting into the fair.^cxlviii The next DSEI arms fair is in September 2019.

Resistance has also focused on Thales, Elbit’s partner in the Watchkeeper programme. In June 2014 a demonstration was held at the company HQ in London. In October 2014, a rooftop occupation was held at a Thales plant in Glasgow.^cxlix

Activists in Kent have been taking direct action against the Instro Precision factory, with numerous rooftop occupations and lock-ons.^cl Campaigners were able to contribute to the local council’s decisions to turn down a planning application for a new site for the Elbit subsidiary at Kent’s Manston airport.^cli

Elbit has been very cautious in prosecuting activists. In 2015, the Crown Prosecution Services dropped the case against nine protesters who had occupied the roof of the UAV engines factory the previous summer. The defendants had been arguing that their actions were justified as Elbit was complicit in war crimes. Crucially, the defendants’ lawyers had been asking for disclosure to the court of documentation of Elbit’s export licenses.

It seems likely the company pulled out of the prosecution to avoid public scrutiny. Ewa Jasiewicz, one of the defendants, said that Elbit was now a “prime target” for direct action to shut the factory down.^clii

Later in 2015, as Palestine Action groups organised Block the Factory protests, a civil injunction was granted to Elbit’s Shenstone factory by the High Court. The police violently tried to enforce the injunction, leading to 19 arrests. However, at a hearing in October the injunction was lifted, as Elbit had failed to provide the correct documentation to the court. A spokesperson for Block the Factory said at the time: “It’s Elbit Systems and its arms factories that should be facing a ban, not our protests. Today’s decision will bring even more energy to our campaigning.”^cliii

Since then, there have been no criminal prosecutions of activists who have targeted Elbit’s subsidiaries in the UK, and very few arrests.

In 2017, five protesters at Elbit subsidiary UAV Engines’ Shenstone factory were arrested under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 for blocking the gates of the factory, however charges were, again, eventually dropped.^cliv

Recently, activists have held coordinated days of action, taking action simultaneously at all of Elbit’s subsidiaries in the UK, in Kent, Staffordshire and Manchester.^clv Some of these have also targeted Elbit’s partner, Thales.^clvi At the most recent event, in June 2018, activist Susannah Mengesha explained her reasons for taking part:

“Elbit commodifies the murder of Palestinian people on an industrial scale. Every day that their factories remain open will have a civilian cost. A direct line can be drawn from the manufacturing processes in factories such as Instro Precision to Israeli war crimes. I refuse to believe that the lives of people in places like Gaza are worth any less than those elsewhere. My heart goes out to the mothers in Gaza, who surely have suffered more than most in the last few weeks and years. I want to tell them that the people here do not consent to these factories being here, and we will do all we can to stop them.”^clvii

Campaigners are also pressuring the EU to exclude Elbit and other Israeli arms companies from its research funding. War on Want, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and other grassroots campaigners in the UK have been involved in an EU lobbying campaign, in conjunction with grassroots activists.

In France, action against Elbit has also been intensifying. Elbit’s inclusion in the tendering process for a new French drone sparked a wave of protests across France, calling for the company to be excluded from the tendering process. Elbit was eventually passed over, in favour of a drone manufactured by Sagem (which, ironically, contained Elbit components).^clviii In 2017, BDS France disrupted Elbit’s stall at the Paris Air Show.^clix Similar protests against Elbit’s presenceat the fair happen every year. Activists have also begun a campaign against the French insurance giant, AXA, calling on the company to divest from Elbit.^clx

Call for increased action

In 2018, Abdulrahman Abunahel, the Gaza Strip Coordinator for the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC), reiterated the call for a two way arms embargo. This came after Israel’s gunning down of Palestinian protesters at the Great Return March and the worst aerial bombardment of Gaza since 2014. He said:

“The global military and security industry plays a central role in helping Israel maintain its half-century of military rule over 4.5 million Palestinians, including its devastating and illegal siege suffocating nearly two million of us here in Gaza, its ongoing, illegal theft of Palestinian land, and its apartheid policies that systematically discriminate against us indigenous people of this land.

“Since March 30th alone, when we Palestinians in occupied Gaza participated in mass demonstrations to simply express our demand to be free and our right as refugees to return home, Israel has killed more than 130 of us and repeatedly bombed densely populated areas.

“Israel is effectively “field-testing” weapons on us Palestinians here in Gaza before exporting them to other countries, mainly in the global south. At the same time, governments and international private military and security companies from the Global North are providing arms and technology to Israel, which Israel used to kill and repress Palestinians.

“The world must act to end these deadly relations and stop arming Israel. I take hope in the fact that more and more people and institutions are calling for an end to all forms of military and security cooperation with Israel and seeking to impose a comprehensive military embargo until it ends its gross violations of Palestinian rights.”

About the prospects for the campaign against Elbit, Maren Mantovani and Jamal Jumaaof Stop the Wall are confident:

“Elbit Systems, big as it is, is particularly vulnerable to activist action. It is the only Israeli private military company of this size and hence is more vulnerable to crises, risks of financial speculation, and economic restructuring. Elbit Systems is highly indebted and needs to ensure a continuous cash flow to service that debt. Its ever more global presence makes it easier for activists in different countries to take on Elbit or its subsidiaries. In addition, the growing dependence of the military industry on the Israeli state budget to rescue it also makes it vulnerable, while increasing the vulnerability of the state.

“When questioned recently about the impact of BDS on Elbit Systems’ operations, CEO Bezhalel Machlis admitted: ‘I’m not saying it’s not a threat, but I think that altogether we can handle it.’ Human rights advocates now face the challenge of increasing the capacity of the BDS movement so that it pressures the Israeli war economy to the extent that it moves from being a threat to a definitive impediment.”^clxi

Background

The battlefields of Israel’s militarism and occupation have proved effective testing grounds for new types of weaponry. Israel’s constant state of warfare has ensured a reliable marketplace for Israeli arms manufacturers. According to Drone Wars UK, surveillance drones were first used in Egypt in the lead up to Israel’s 1973 attack. The first recorded use of an Israeli drone to help piloted warplanes bomb targets was in 1982, in the run up to the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon.

The Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights say the first recorded use of an armed drone by Israel was in 2004. The experience gleaned during years of military repression has made Israel the largest exporter of drone technology in the world. Israeli arms companies have sold drones to over 50 countries.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW):

“the missile fired from a drone has its own cameras that allow the operator to observe the target from the moment of firing. The optics on both the drone and missiles include imaging infrared cameras that allow operators to see individuals at night as well as during the day. With these visual capabilities, drone operators should have been able to tell the difference between fighters and others directly participating in hostilities, who are legitimate targets, and civilians, who are immune from attack, and to hold fire if that determination could not be made. If a last-second doubt arises about a target, the drone operator can use the missile’s remote guidance system to divert the fired missile, steering the missile away from the target with a joystick.”

Despite this, the number of deaths (as a proportion of total deaths) caused by drone strikes has been increasing. During our 2013 visit to Gaza, Corporate Watch interviewed several survivors of Israeli drone attacks who had not been involved in any fighting before they were targeted, while many of those killed by drone attacks are children. The Gaza based Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights provided Corporate Watch with these figures for the years 2000-2012:

Israeli drone strikes are carried out from the Palmachin and Tel Nof air force bases.^clxii

Written by Tom Anderson of Shoal Collective, a cooperative of writers and researchers writing for social justice and a world beyond capitalism. @shoalcollective

Tom’s writing in support of the BDS movement can be found at corporateoccupation.org. @CorpOccupation

The post Elbit Systems: company profile appeared first on Corporate Watch.

For information on what to do if you see a raid, including legal advice cards and posters to print out in many languages, see the Antiraids Network website.

Raids are the Home Office’s basic terror tactic against migrants inside the UK. Nineteen raid squads across the country – called Immigration Compliance and Enforcement (ICE) teams – hit dozens of addresses each day.

First come dawn raids against residential addresses, to catch people while they’re still sleeping. Later, the squads hit restaurants, shops and factories in “illegal working” raids: there are around 6,000 of these a year, arresting around 5,000 people. Or they join up with police and others in multi-agency operations against public transport, rough sleepers, street markets, and other targets.

Largely based on tip-offs and other “low grade intelligence”, the squads hit easy targets – their great favourite is Indian takeaways. Yet they often come away with few arrests, and many people are released straight away as “not removable”. What the raids do, though, is spread a climate of fear in migrant communities – affecting “legal” as well as “illegal” migrants.

In this briefing first we give a basic snapshot of some main types of raids and who they target. Then we’ll look at a few issues in more depth:

• Informing by “members of the public”. Around 50,000 public tip-offs a year provide the bulk of initial intelligence.
• Employer collaboration. Standard ICE approaches include getting employers to hand over workers’ personal details, including home addresses, or even helping arrange workplace sting operations or “arrests by appointment” – as in the infamous 2016 case of Byron Burgers.
• Entry and interrogation without warrants. Less than half of raids are sanctioned by court warrants. Immigration officers typically claim that businesses give so-called “consent” on the door.
• The impact of resistance. There has been significant resistance to raids in recent years. This has changed the way squads operate, and noticeably dented their arrogance.

Types of raids

The ICE teams carry out various kinds of operations, from crashing wedding ceremonies to linking up with ticket inspectors on buses and at train stations in working class areas. We do not have precise figures, but we know that most raids are of two types: residential raids, and workplace raids.

Until around 2015, high profile “street stops” – stopping and questioning people just walking in the street – were another common tactic. These have decreased in recent years, after provoking controversy as particularly blatant “fishing expeditions” based on racial profiling.

Workplace raids vary from routine corner-shop busts to operations against big factories or multiple premises, possibly involving a number of ICE teams alongside other state agencies. It would be good to do more research on residential raids. But the task is hard: they are highly secretive, happening well away from the public gaze, and with minimal reporting or oversight. And with rare exceptions (e.g. the Glasgow tower blocks that organised against regular dawn raids in the mid 2000s) this means they have faced less coordinated resistance.

There is also a need to investigate raid activities linked to newer hostile environment policies. For example, the “right to rent” introduced in the 2014 Immigration Act requires landlords to check documents of prospective tenants. This may have led to new kinds of residential raids – e.g. ICE teams sourcing “illegal renters’” details from landlords or letting agents.

A snapshot in figures

One statistic the Home Office publishes is the number of arrests made every three months – but only from raids “where the intelligence source type is recorded as information received”. In 2017, 3,034 people were arrested in raids following “information received”. Less than a quarter of them, 697, ended up being deported.ⁱ

For workplace raids, a good snapshot comes from a December 2015 report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI).ⁱⁱ According to this, the Home Office carried out a total of 36,381 illegal working “visits” across the UK in the six years from 2009 to 2014. That is roughly 6,000 workplace raids a year. From those, there were 29,113 arrests, just under 5,000 a year. More than two thirds of visits (24,621, or 68%) didn’t lead to any “illegal workers identified” or arrested, but clearly others ended with multiple arrests. Although we don’t have comparable figures since 2015, we believe the same patterns continue.

The raid squads

There are nineteen ICE teams in the UK. Five of them cover London areas. The Central and North teams are both based at Becket House, next to London Bridge station. The South team is based at the main Home Office headquarters in Lunar House, Croydon. You can see the full list of teams and their bases on the Home Office website.

Each local unit is headed by an Assistant Director. Raid squads on the ground are usually headed by an Inspector or Chief Immigration Officer, and made up of a mix of Immigration Officers (IOs), and Assistant Immigration Officers (AIOs). New officers get just 25 days basic training, plus another three weeks taught by the College of Policing before they are “arrest trained”.

Many recruits come from within the Home Office: junior office workers who take the chance of a more active life with slightly better pay. Others are recruited externally. Quite a few are ex-soldiers, a smaller number are ex-police. On the whole, there is not so much love lost between police and ICE: IOs are paid worse than real cops, and looked down on as ill-trained amateurs.

On the other hand, according to their trade union leader, the ICE team officer who makes the most arrests in a month does get “cake and possibly a box of Roses chocolates”.

Alongside the raid teams themselves, there are much smaller local Operational Intelligence Units (OIUs), staffed by Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs). ICE teams are meant to pass on more serious “organised crime” investigations to the Crime and Financial Investigation (CFI) teams. A separate central unit, called the Civil Penalty Compliance Team (CPCT), is in charge of chasing up penalties for employers found breaking immigration rules.

ICE culture and morale

Some insights into the culture of the ICE teams come from interviews carried out by the Oxford University research project called “Does Immigration Enforcement Matter”.ⁱⁱⁱ The overall impression is of rock bottom morale. Interviewed officers raised many specific complaints, including:

• Confusing internal structures: “the problem is we’ve got so many directorates and strategic, you know, teams, so many little enforcement units around the country” (words of an Immigration Officer); “it’s this obsession with re-branding, even changing the names of units and acronyms” (a Chief Immigration Officer).
• London bias: “a very London-centric organisation” (an IO).
• Stress and overwork: “[we’re told to] keep on nicking people, you just churn, churn, churn” (a former IO).
• Budget cuts and low pay: austerity means smaller teams, intelligence gathering is skipped, staff are moved around the country to deal with crises, and backlogs build up. Above all, officers complained about a ban on overtime: “management said no overtime, seniors said no budget. So what happens, we do unpaid hours” (an IO).
• Outdated IT and an incoherent array of systems. (See The UK Border Regime chapter 11).
• Bullying: “bullying is quite a problem” (a CIO).
• Leading to general low morale: “my incentive to do the job is rock bottom” (an IO), “morale is very, very low” (a former manager).

Who gets raided?

The 2015 ICIBI report gives a snapshot of who is arrested in workplace raids. The number one targets are South Asian men.

Twelve times more men than women were arrested between September 2012 and January 2014. In the same period, 75% of all people arrested in workplace raids were from Bangladesh, Pakistan or India, in that order. The top ten nationalities, in full, were: Bangladesh 27%, Pakistan 27%, India 21%, China 10%, Nigeria 3%, Afghanistan 3%, Sri Lanka 3%, Nepal 2%, Vietnam 2%, Albania 2%.

The gender balance mirrors detention places, but the nationality breakdown is fairly specific to workplace raids. It reflects not just the history of British colonialism, but the types of businesses that offer easy targets. The ICIBI report sampled 184 visit files, and found:

… one hundred and seven of the 184 premises visited were high street restaurants and/or takeaways, mostly Indian Subcontinent or Chinese cuisine, with some fried chicken outlets.^iv

The high number of Pakistanis is also connected to the attempt to fill regular charter flight deportations to that country (see The UK Border Regime chapter 8). On the other hand, Chinese people are seen as generally harder to deport – the Chinese government does not co-operate so readily with providing travel documents.

The ICIBI report suggests that Home Office bosses don’t see the obsession with Asian restaurants as ideal: “some ICE managers told us that more attention should be paid to other sectors.” But we still haven’t seen much evidence of change.

In the ICIBI sample, 45% of people arrested were “overstayers”, i.e. people who arrived in the UK on a valid visa but then stayed after it had run out; 20% were “illegal entrants”; 13% were “working in breach” of their visa conditions: e.g. asylum seekers or students working full time.

Timeline: from tip-off to detention

• 1. Gathering “intelligence”

Intelligence officers sort through tip-offs, add their own leads, and supposedly “research and enrich” them. They then prepare “intelligence packages” on potential targets.

• 2. Picking targets

Each ICE unit has a weekly “tasking group” meeting to plan operations. This might consider 40 or 50 potential operations, though not all will be approved. It will look at:

• “packages” presented by intelligence officers;
• residential targets sent by case workers and reporting centres, e.g. “absconders” (see The UK Border Regime chapter 5);
• monthly priorities set by national and regional commanders;
• priorities sent by the National Removals Command (NRC), e.g. to fill a charter flight;
• joint working plans with neighbouring ICE teams and with other agencies such as police and local authorities.

In the absence of special instructions, “removability” tops the criteria for deciding targets. Some nationalities are much easier to deport than others: e.g. Albanians and Pakistanis, the biggest charter flight nationalities. At the bottom are Syrians or Palestinians, or nationalities such as Iranians or Russians whose governments don’t readily co-operate in issuing travel documents. The NRC, which is in charge of coordinating all deportations and also authorising detentions, plays a key role here. (See our briefing on deportations.)

• 3. Planning and legal access

The tasking group will allocate an “officer in charge” for each raid. They should make a plan for the raid and co-ordinate with police or other agencies involved. They may carry out reconnaissance (a “recce”) of the target. However, budget cuts mean nowadays recces are often just a quick look on Google Earth.

In theory, the officer in charge should also prepare a legal means to gain access to the target address. The three main options are: a court warrant; an “Assistant Director’s letter”; or claimed “consent” from the legal occupier of the property. As discussed below, these procedures are systematically abused.

• 4. The daily grind

ICE teams typically assemble in the early hours (e.g. around 4 to 5 am) for morning briefings, then head out for residential dawn raids. The schedule may change if, e.g. major “joint agency” operations are planned. Raids continue through the day, and into the evening, on workplaces and other targets. Each ICE unit may have two or more teams working simultaneously. They may aim to carry out around five “visits” during the day – although this could also include other duties such as “compliance visits” on employers (see below).

• 5. The raid

Squads gain entry to the premises, with or without legal “consent”. In theory, they should only question: individuals who have come to their attention through “prior intelligence”; their family members; or other people whose behaviour gives specific grounds to suspect them of “immigration offences”. In practice, though, they just round up anyone who looks or sounds “foreign”. They aggressively question people, and may use mobile fingerprint scanners. They may also search the property, e.g. for documents, money, and driving licenses (in order to prosecute people under the new “driving whilst illegal” law – see The UK Border Regime chapter 10 on Hostile Environment measures).

• 6. Arrests – “removability”

Arrested people are taken back to the ICE base. This is usually in a building shared with a “reporting centre” (see The UK Border Regime chapter 5) and a cell block called a Short Term Holding Facility. Private Mitie security guards handle custody. But arrests also take one or more immigration officers out of action for several hours to process the prisoners.

That includes calling the National Removals Command, who have to authorise any detentions. This is a source of tension: officers get frustrated if they are instructed to release captives who don’t meet current NRC priorities. Those who are detained will be collected in the evening by a Mitie transport van. Other people may be released with reporting requirements.

• 7. Aftermath

The proportion of removals following ICE “intelligence led” raids is extremely low. Only 23% of “enforcement visit arrests linked to information received” actually led to anyone being “removed”. Many others will linger in detention for weeks, months, or even years before being let go.

As for the employers, there is the chance of a criminal charge, but the most common outcome is a civil penalty of up to £20,000 per worker (see below). However, the Home Office’s record in actually collecting these fines is poor. According to the 2015 ICIBI report, only “around 31% of debt raised was recovered and […] it took an average of 28.4 months to recover it.”

Allegations: where does “intelligence” come from?

In June 2014, ICE “intelligence” files for a two-week series of nationwide raids called Operation Centurion were leaked to the Anti Raids Network and other campaigners. The files included “intelligence packages” on 225 targets – many of which were then successfully warned. They give a very handy glimpse of how Immigration Enforcement finds its victims. Our 2016 report “Snitches, Stings and Leaks” analysed the files. Here we recap some of the main points.

Debates around immigration raids have sometimes focused on the issue of “racial profiling”. The question hit national media after the Operation Centurion leak, as Labour politician Keith Vaz, then Chair of the House of Commons Home Affairs committee, appeared on TV condemning the way raids appeared to be “fishing expeditions” for particular national groups, rather than being truly “intelligence led”.

And yet there certainly is “intelligence” behind the raids. In theory, all allegations received by Immigration Enforcement are processed onto a central computer system called the Information Management System (IMS).^v The Home Office releases some basic statistics on this information. For example, in 2017 IMS had 64,456 information reports. 26,830 were about people with “no permission to stay in the UK”, and 12,538 about “illegal working”. Other tip-offs concerned bogus marriages (6,626), fake or false documents (4,411), lying on applications (3,406), helping other people enter or stay in the country (1,983), smuggling goods (1,718), and human trafficking (985).

Where did the information come from? Another ICIBI inspection report on “The Intelligence Functions of Border Force and Immigration Enforcement”, published in July 2016, helps here. In the twelve months between August 2014 and July 2015, 74,617 allegations were entered into the system. 49,109 came from “the public”, including from calls to the Immigration Enforcement hotline, electronically via a form on the Gov.uk website, and in person to officers. Another 7,540 tip-offs were forwarded from Crimestoppers. 17,818 pieces of information were referred by “other Government departments”. Finally, 150 tip-offs came from MPs – presumably passing on information from constituents.^vi

On this basis, it looks like the majority of ICE intelligence consists of snitching from “members of the public”. But how much use does Immigration Enforcement make of these public tip-offs? Many are likely to be “low grade” to say the least. And what proportion of operations come from officers acting on their own initiative, rather than responding to allegations at all?

Public snitching in the Centurion files

The Centurion files give a few hints.^vii 30 of the leaked entries offer clues to where the initial lead came from. Eight mention “allegations”. For example, one entry notes an “allegation of 30 illegally working students” at a cleaning company; in an import company an “allegation has been received that they are employing persons illegally”; a manufacturing company is “alleged to be employing [Brazilian] nationals”.

Another seven cases are referrals from other agencies, including three from the police. After a worker contacts the police saying they have been trafficked and forced to work at a meat-packing plant, the police contact IE requesting involvement in a joint operation. In Glasgow, an “Immigration offender [is] encountered by police at Possible House of Multiple Occupancy […] Others possibly residing there.” Elsewhere, police propose a joint op also involving trading standards “during a series of test purchases at off licenses and pubs”. Two cases involve the Security Industry Authority (SIA), which licenses security guards. In one, the SIA passes on a lead on a large security company in Luton; in another, ICE are planning to actually “attend an SIA test and check status of candidates”.

Five cases recycle old targets, including two to firms that haven’t paid old penalties, while another mentions “previous excellent results from enforcement visit”. Two other cases dig up unspecified “old intel”. In two cases, ICE has approached a company to provide information on its cleaning contractors, which then become targets.

If this sample is anything to go by, many ops do seem to start with a tip-off. There is just one mention in the documents of a team “cold calling” to do speculative intelligence gathering, in this case around hotels in South London. Although there is another reference to “markets being scoped/developed”, which might involve teams starting from scratch in a targeted area.

This picture is also supported by the 2015 ICIBI report on Illegal Working. The inspector looked at a sample of 184 cases that had been evaluated according to the National Intelligence Model (NIM) “5x5x5” rating system – a standard model used by the police and other UK law enforcement agencies. In this system a piece of information is classified on three scales: the source is rated from A (always reliable) to E (untested); the particular information is evaluated from 1 (known to be true) to 5 (suspected to be false); and another scale from 1 to 5 indicates who can have access to the information.

In 127 cases, information is said to come from rated “sources”. One fact leaps out: 98 of these are rated as E4: “untested source, information not known personally to source, and cannot be corroborated”. Another eight were rated E3 “untested source, information not known personally to source, but corroborated.” Only 20 were rated as B2 or B3, from “tested” sources, and none as A. In the other 57 cases the source evaluation was “not known, intelligence rating not shown or not clear in file”.

And there is further confirmation from the ICIBI report on “Intelligence Functions” (para 6.11), which adds:

In interviews and focus groups, staff commented that IE was overly reliant on allegations received from members of the public, and did not gather enough intelligence through enforcement teams and Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs). As a result, it was reactive rather than proactive.

In conclusion, there is substantial evidence that Immigration Enforcement “intelligence” does make heavy use of uncorroborated tip-offs from unknown “members of the public”.

However, we should add one last point. Immigration Enforcement has strong political, and indeed legal, reasons to represent itself as “intelligence led”, as not conducting “fishing expeditions”. For this reason, we might expect that available data under-represent operations carried out on the basis of no allegations at all. This would also hold for the Operation Centurion files. If ICE teams are regularly “cold calling” high street takeaways, they are not likely to document this even internally.

So our general conclusion might be: a lot of ICE intelligence comes from uncorroborated public informing; some operations may not be based on any intelligence at all.

Employer collaboration

In July 2016 the restaurant chain Byron Hamburgers caused an outcry after setting up a “sting operation” with the Home Office to trap its own workers. Managers called in staff for early morning meetings, described as about “Health & Safety” or “a new kind of hamburger”. When they arrived they were met by ICE officers, who made 35 arrests in different restaurants.

As Byron was hit with pickets, boycott calls and an actual plague of locusts, mainstream and social media debated the morality and legality of its actions. But was the Byron sting an exceptional case, or is this common ICE practice?

Just a few weeks before, on 2 June, ICE had raided the London training centre of Deliveroo, the food delivery courier company, whose workers had been protesting about a cut in wages. The raid was a joint operation with police (focusing on drugs) and the Department of Work and Pensions, and ended with three arrests for immigration offences. Workers present said that Deliveroo management actively assisted the raid and, according to one online report, Immigration Officers arrived with “a list of names with photos of Deliveroo drivers they were looking for”. In a media statement the next day, a Deliveroo spokeswoman confirmed that: “we have worked with the Metropolitan Police to assist in a documentation check at our Angel office yesterday.”

Two earlier high-profile cases occurred in May 2007 and 2009, both involving contract cleaning companies: Amey and ISS. In December 2006, Amey took over the cleaning contract at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in Middlessex, and with it a workforce of 36 cleaners. The new contractor moved to “rationalise” staff numbers. The cleaners, who were seeking trade union recognition rights, resisted. Amey’s next move, as told by union rep Julio Mayor, was as follows:

they summoned all the workers to a closed area under the pretext of a training session. 15 minutes after we had assembled, about 60 police and immigration officials arrived and took away six people undocumented in the UK. Part of the policy of Amey was to get rid of the workers who were working there before they won the contract and they used every tool they had. All the workers were Latin American.

In June 2009, ISS, the cleaning contractor for the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London, made a very similar move against its largely unionised staff.

Cleaning staff were told to attend an ‘emergency staff meeting’ at 6.30am […] Within minutes the meeting was raided by at least twenty immigration officers. The cleaners were locked in the room and escorted one-by-one into another classroom where they were interrogated.

How common are these kinds of operations? The Amey and ISS cases came to light because some of the workers targeted were active trade unionists and campaigners who raised a public outcry. The case of Byron, too, was initially reported in Spanish speaking media, then raised by Black activist groups on social media, and only picked up by mainstream UK press weeks later after the “#boycottbyron” hashtag went viral on twitter. We can suppose that there are more cases of this kind, which do not receive media attention.

In fact, we can read the following bare statement in the Home Office’s official staff guidance on “Illegal Working Operations”:

The majority of reports about suspected illegal working come from employers.

How does that square with the last section, where we saw that the bulk of information starts with “members of the public”? One possibility is that employers are also counted as “members of the public” in the figures, and so many of the 50,000 tip-offs come straight from bosses. Another is that, even if anonymous tip-offs are often the first lead, ICE teams typically follow up by approaching employers and demanding more information.

Employer collaboration in the Centurion files

This picture is confirmed by the leaked Centurion files. 18 entries explicitly mention discussions between ICE and employers. For example, Midlands ICE teams plan to visit “markets and engage with managers there and do some intelligence gathering there”. In London, “contact to be made with Berkeley Homes over a large construction site in Greenwich”. In another case, “contact made with Holiday Inn […], awaiting return contact from HR”.

In other cases, the entries report that relationships have been established and the company is co-operating. The most common form of cooperation is handing over staff files and other information on workers. E.g.: “Contact made with Coral Bookmakers and William Hill bookmakers for sites across South London, 900+ staff files are being checked and it is conservatively anticipated there will be at least 5 offenders across the sites.” Or in a care home: “staff list of 95 obtained and 8 offenders traced.” One entry mentions the British Horse Racing Association “providing staff details (which we have not yet received)” on stable workers.

Three entries concern recruitment agencies. One case note reads as if the initial approach came from the company: intelligence officers are planning to visit the agency after “they noticed an increase in Africans submitting Italian ID cards and [passports].”

Another interesting entry refers to a visit by Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs) to a recruitment agency where “12 offenders were identified”. It ends: “residential visits to be tasked”. That is, it seems the agency is passing on home addresses of people on its books looking for work, so that ICE can then raid their houses.

As well as passing information on workers, employers may also point the finger at other employers. Two cases are mentioned in the files: in both, Immigration Enforcement is “contacting” or “in communication” with companies – a car auction site and a cinema chain – about their cleaning contractors.

Finally, two entries may indeed refer to Byron-style operations where arrests are set up “by appointment” with bosses. One from the South East team reads: “FIOs are liaising with cleaning companies with a view to arrests by appointment being made.” The other is from the South Central team: “FIO looking at a mid size warehouse […] which is owned by a Chinese national. FIOs are still liaising with cleaning companies with a view to arrests by appointment being made.” Given the very similar wording, these two entries may indeed be talking about the same operation: apparently a large operation against a number of companies, and across at least two local ICE areas.

There is one entry in the documents about an employer, or in fact an employers’ association, not cooperating. Officers contacted the association “to establish information flows however this is looking unlikely due to a reluctance to work with Immigration Enforcement”. This is the only case of non-cooperation noted in the documents. Of course, other potential cases may not have made it into the files for precisely that reason.

The Centurion files suggest that it is very often Immigration Enforcement, acting on a prior tip-off, who initiate contact with employers. This seems to make sense: under most circumstances, why would it be in an employers’ interest to “bring down heat” on themselves? After all, one of the perks of “illegal” labour is that it’s not hard to fire workers.

But we can also think of exceptions. For example, an employer might be unwilling to do their own dirty work of firing workers, perhaps because of social or family connections to workers. Or some employers may be keen to have help in taking on a “difficult” workforce, perhaps where workers are organising. This, of course, is exactly the situation in which Amey, ISS, and possibly Deliveroo, set their stings.

“Educating” employers

In the second half of 2014, the Home Office ran a programme called Operation Skybreaker to pilot a new enforcement approach in the ten areas of highest “known” illegal immigration – all in London. The main change was the introduction of so-called “educational visits” in advance of raids.

Before making an enforcement visit to a business to follow up information received about individuals suspected of working there illegally, IE would first visit the business to encourage them to comply with employment requirements.^viii

This scheme has since been rolled out nationwide – although, budget cuts mean teams may not always follow it. “Educational visits” serve a number of objectives. One is public relations, presenting Immigration Enforcement as a friendly service “encouraging” rather than punishing. Another is trying to scare workers into voluntary return, much cheaper than forced deportation. Another is to approach employers about collaboration, whilst gathering more intelligence.^ix The Home Office’s evaluation of Operation Skybreaker specifically states that “intelligence generated” from educational visits in the pilot “led to 65 arrests”.^x

According to people involved in the Anti Raids Network, this is what typically happens: intelligence officers or ICE teams call into a business, or sometimes telephone. They ask for full staff lists, and may demand further information on specific individuals. The threat, made implicitly or explicitly, is that if firms do not hand over all information requested they will face a hostile raid.

In September 2014, the Anti Raids Network published a copy of a “consent form” Immigration Enforcement had asked a business to sign. This form was headed “Authorisation for Immigration Officers to review Staff Records”. It gives permission to Immigration Enforcement to enter the premises and to check and copy staff records. The gathered “information may be shared by the Home Office with other government departments and law enforcement agencies”.

The form states clearly: “I am aware that I am not obliged to provide consent. I can refuse to answer any questions and ask the officers to leave at any time for any reason”. As this makes clear, ICE are well aware that companies are not legally obliged to hand over personal information on workers. But they don’t make a habit of explaining this to scared shopkeepers.

Anti Raids Network write:

“During our outreach, we have found that a lot of people have been signing consent forms. However, when we’ve told people that there is no obligation to sign, many said that they were unaware that it was voluntary, while others said ‘you can’t do anything to stop them – they do whatever they want’. In practice of course, it is very hard to refuse – regardless of whether this is your legal right.”

Pressuring collaboration

This brings up an important legal question. In the Byron Hamburgers case, the chain’s media defenders argued it was legally obliged to co-operate with Immigration Enforcement in setting a trap for its workers. This is not true. The choice was not legal but financial. Here are the basic points:^xi

• The 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts – part of Theresa May’s hostile environment drive – make it a criminal offence to employ someone if the employer “knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the person has no right to do the work in question”.^xii For example, an employer could be convicted if the court finds they “deliberately ignored information or circumstances” about the worker’s status.

• In addition, an employer is also liable to pay a civil penalty for employing someone who doesn’t have the legal right to do the work. This is separate from the criminal matter: ICE can impose a civil penalty simply by issuing a notice, without having to go before a court and prove their case.^xiii

• But the employer does not have to pay if they can show evidence that they have “correctly carried out the prescribed right to work checks using acceptable documents”. (Legally, this is a “statutory excuse”.) This involves checking the worker’s ID documents, and not accepting these documents if it is “reasonably apparent” that they are false or do not belong to the worker.^xiv This would apply if the documents are obvious fakes – but not, for example, if they are clever forgeries the company couldn’t be expected to spot.^xv
• If the employer fails to show it has done the checks correctly, it faces a maximum penalty of £20,000 – or £15,000 if it has not been found employing an illegal worker during the last three years.

• But the penalty can be reduced on certain grounds. Crucially, these include: £5,000 off for reporting suspected illegal workers to Immigration Enforcement; another £5,000 off for “actively co-operating”, which involves granting ICE access to premises and answering all questions and document requests.^xvi

To sum up: there is no general legal requirement for companies to hand over any documents in advance of a raid. Companies may choose to show documents to prove they have correctly applied right to work checks.

On the other hand, while there is no legal obligation, there are financial incentives – if the company thinks it may get caught hiring “illegal” workers, it can reduce penalties by “co-operating”. For example, in the Byron Burgers case, the company had already been caught in 2015, so less than three years before, employing at least one illegal worker. But it could have got its penalties halved to £10,000 rather than £20,000 by reporting its workers and then “actively co-operating”.

Two tier economy

Immigration Enforcement does not stop people working illegally – but it makes people work fearfully. It helps maintain a segregated “two tier workforce” in which hundreds of thousands of workers have no access to the rights or safeguards available to others. Fear of raids keeps workers in the lower tier scattered, unseen and unheard. The threat of Immigration Enforcement provides the ultimate human resources tool to stop workers becoming “difficult” and organising to demand improved rights or conditions – as seen in the cases of Amey or ISS.

It is important to see that this is not an issue just of a peripheral minority. Illegal workers are at the heart of the UK economy: building workers, office cleaners, food pickers and packers, warehouse lifters, drivers and couriers, the menials in every service industry. The “discount” on illegal workers makes a fundamental contribution to every business model.

But while every blue chip company relies on “illegal” labour this is not illegal – for them – so long as these workers are not directly employed. Only the base level contractors or sub-contractors who immediately hire cleaners or labourers are liable for “right to work checks” and penalties.^xvii As we saw, one Immigration Enforcement tactic is to approach higher tier companies for information on contractors. Raids are usually kept at base level, leaving the “respectable” companies unscathed.

Fabricating consent

In many vampire stories, the undead can enter a building only when invited in by the occupiers. ICE teams often work on a similar principle.

There are currently four main ways they can legally gain access to a property. These are:

• Warrant granted by a magistrate’s court
• Assistant Director’s (AD) letter

A Home Office Assistant Director has a special power to authorise entry without a warrant. This is only meant to be used in urgent situations where it would be unreasonable to wait for a warrant.

• “Informed consent”

The legal occupier of the property can grant officers their consent to enter. According to Immigration Enforcement guidance, this means “a person’s agreement to allow something to happen after the person has been informed of all the risks involved and the alternatives”.^xviii The ICIBI Illegal Working report clarifies that “the guidance requires ‘fully informed’ consent in writing by a person ‘entitled to grant entry’”.

• Licensed premises exemption

The Immigration Act 2016 gave ICE teams a new power, which came into force in April 2017. They are now legally able to enter businesses if these are “licensed to sell alcohol or late night refreshment”. It does not apply to other kinds of “licensed premises” such as entertainment venues or members’ clubs.^xix This will do nothing to halt ICE’s habit of raiding curry houses.

In the 2016 ICIBI report on Illegal Working Operations (so before the new licensing power), the Inspector looked at how raids were carried out for the sample of 184 cases. This included how ICE teams gained entry to targeted premises. In 79 cases, the teams had court warrants. In three cases, the power of entry was not clear in the records. In the large majority, 102 visits, Immigration Officers entered without any warrant – claiming they had informed consent to do so.

An earlier ICIBI inspection from 2014 found widespread abuse of the AD Letter power: letters were used routinely, rather than only in exceptional cases.^xx Following that report, the use of letters seems to have gone right down.

As we noted, “informed consent” is meant to be in writing, and only “after the person has been informed of all the risks involved and the alternatives”. According to people involved in the Anti Raids Network, this is what really happens: ICE officers turn up at the door and ask to speak to the manager, while other officers may already have sealed off other exits to prevent people from leaving the building; the officers then ask the manager (or an available worker) for verbal consent to enter the premises, or at best to sign a paper granting written consent on the spot.

As the ICIBI report notes, there is minimal recording of how consent was established. The inspector saw no records of how squads checked the person they spoke to was “entitled to grant entry”. And, “in most premises visited, English was not always the first language of those encountered.” “Files rarely documented how officers confirmed that consent was ‘fully informed’ as required.”^xxi There is no requirement for teams to keep signed consent letters on file and available for inspection. So there is no way for consent to later be proved or disproved, or for the officers involved in gaining consent to be held to account.

Questioning

Consent to enter is one issue; another is consent for questioning. The law and Home Office guidance allows Immigration Enforcement to enter premises in pursuit of specific named individuals suspected of immigration offences – again, this is key to the claim of “intelligence led” operations. Officers do not have a general power to question anyone else. They may only “invite” other people to answer “consensual questions” if “they had brought themselves to attention, such as by ‘behaviour (for example an attempt to conceal himself or leave hurriedly)’.”^xxii

Once again, the ICIBI Illegal Working report shows that Immigration Officers routinely break the rules:

In the 184 files we sampled there was no record of anyone being ‘invited’ to answer ‘consensual questions’. The files showed that officers typically gathered everyone on the premises together, regardless of the information known or people’s actions.^xxiii

Even if raids are initially targeted based on some form of (low grade) “intelligence”, once inside the building they become a general round-up.

Resistance and its impact

There has always been resistance to immigration raids. But in the last five years or so it has become substantially more visible, and this has had significant impacts on ICE tactics.

Here are just a few examples of recent resistance:

• February 2013: demonstration and anti-raids patrol of Old Kent Road, South London, which disrupts raid.
• August 2013: Southall Black Sisters chase raid squad out of Southall, London.
• June 2014: leak of “Operation Centurion” documents, after which nearly 200 targets across the UK are warned.
• May 2015: a large crowd chases raid out of Peckham, South London, video “goes viral”.
• June 2015: over 100 people try to rescue arrested man on East Street, South London.
• July 2015: locals chase major immigration raid out of Shadwell, East London, and sabotage vans – the Daily Mail spreads the story blaming a “Muslim gang”.
• 2016-17: after a wave of raids targeting the fast gentrifying Deptford Market in South London, raids are chased off and vans smashed, local traders organise a network to alert each other and resist raids together.

These are just a few high profile stories that have spread, whether through national media, social media, or at street level through leaflets, posters, and word of mouth. There are many more smaller scale examples.

An initiative called the Anti Raids Network was formed in 2012 to spread information about raids and how to resist them. As its members point out, this is by no means responsible for “organising” the widespread local resistance against raids. It helps circulate raid alerts, and stories of resistance. Local groups involved with the network have also run legal and practical workshops, held local information stalls, and more.

There was a noticeable shift in Immigration Enforcement approaches after the major episodes of Summer 2015. ICE teams were clearly nervous about growing resistance. Stories of “mobs” and smashed windscreens spread from London, and were talked about by anxious officers in Wales and Scotland. Numerous incidents were reported where raid teams now backed down and left after just a few people “stood up” to them. That could mean as little as simply blocking entrances, handing out “know your rights” cards, or just shouting at squads to go away. ICE teams also monitor social media to see if there are call-outs for people to gather and resist raids.

Our understanding is that, after resistance began to spread, ICE orders were as follows:

• If squads anticipate resistance when planning a raid, e.g. in areas known to be “troublesome”, they should ask for police to accompany them.
• If during an operation squads think people are gathering to resist them, they should hold off and call a senior commander back at base.
• Very often, the commander will instruct them to quit the operation (make a “tactical retreat”). Back-up is limited, and senior officers do not want to take responsibility for giving the order if something goes wrong.

On the other hand, we have also heard of more recent cases (since 2017) where ICE commanders have instructed officers to arrest people (including UK citizens) for “obstruction”. This may often backfire. Immigration Officers are not trained in “public order” tactics or law, and in the cases we have heard of, people arrested were later acquitted or charges were dropped as ICE bungled their procedures.

In 2017, we know of at least two people arrested for “obstructing immigration officers” – in both cases, the cases collapsed before or in court. Earlier, the “East Street Three” were people singled out from the resistance on 21 June 2015 and charged with “violent disorder”. Two were acquitted by a jury, charges against the third were later dropped. In 2016, ICE teamed up with a Metropolitan Police “gangs unit” for a “sting operation” where a fake raid was staged off Deptford High Street. Two people were arrested for alleged criminal damage – but again, both were acquitted. Of course, there may well be other people we don’t know of who have suffered repression for resisting raids.

It is important to remember that ICE have neither the powers nor the training of police officers. They are not used to serious resistance, the mainstay of their job is kicking down sleeping peoples’ doors. They rely on police support for more difficult operations – but police commanders rarely see helping ICE as a priority. In addition, as discussed above, immigration raids may often themselves be unlawful due to the routine abuse of warrants or “consent”, so squads may not want to draw attention to their own rule-breaking.

In the last year or two, resistance has been somewhat quieter in London. But, as we write, new local Antiraids groups are forming and holding street stalls in London areas (in Newham and Waltham Forest). In Bristol on 25 October, 100 people blocked a street for five hours to hold off a raid van.

Raid resistance is a very accessible and powerful form of action against the border regime. Raids happen right by us, in our workplaces, on the streets we walk down every day. No special expertise or equipment is needed to take action. And action is very often successful. Stopping a raid has a very direct impact, someone isn’t detained. But also, the experience of standing up to the border regime and winning empowers those involved, and inspires more people to stand up too.

The post UK Border Regime: immigration raids briefing October 2018 appeared first on Corporate Watch.

• Security is a global boom industry, and unlike other outsourcing giants G4S remains profitable and growing.

• G4S also runs prisons and immigration detention centres in the UK, Australia and South Africa under its “G4S Care and Justice” subsidiary. These are amongst its most profitable contracts.

• Although it recently sold most of its controversial Israeli business, G4S works with Afghan warlords and in regimes like Syria or Sudan. It has a long record of scandals, failures and controversies – but keeps on winning new contracts.

Do you have any information you’d like to share about G4S? Contact us securely through our contact page.

Business basics

The business has three main parts:

• “Secure Solutions”: human security guards, security technology, warzone mercenaries, and “facilities management” which integrates security with other management and maintenance contracting. It is active in 82 countries, and works with a range of corporate, public sector, and private clients.

• “Cash Solutions”: cash transport vans and related technology. It is active in 42 countries and makes up 14% of the company’s core revenue.

• “Care and Justice”: a sub-division of Secure Solutions operating in the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It runs prisons, immigration detention centres, police stations, and some other government services such as asylum housing. It only makes up 7% of G4S’ total business. But profit rates are typically much higher than for “mundane guarding” work.

G4S operates through around 600 local subsidiaries. They typically – though not always – use the G4S branding. Its head office is in Crawley, not far from Gatwick Airport.

Total revenue in 2017 was £7.4 billion. Profit after tax was a reasonable £236 million. G4S paid out £290m to its shareholders in dividends in the last two years.

The bulk – 80% – of G4S’ contracts are with the private sector. Globally, the company has 150,000 customers and 55,000 suppliers. 34% of Secure Solutions business comes from major corporations and industrials; 18% financial institutions; 10% from the retail sector; with other business in energy, transport, and leisure sectors. The largest individual customer is Bank of America.

Only around 5% of G4S’ business now comes from the UK government, down significantly from a few years ago. It continues to lose money on some existing UK state contracts, notably the COMPASS asylum housing deal – but all of these “onerous contracts” date to before 2013. Its prison and detention contracts, on the other hand, are highly profitable. According to the Financial Times, these “contracts earn margins of more than 15 per cent, higher than for more mundane guarding.”

Most of its revenue (£4.61 billion) came from the “developed markets” of the US and Europe. “Emerging markets” revenues were £2.8 billion, with the main regions in order of size being: Middle East and India (£845m), Asia Pacific (£736m), Latin America (£700m) and Africa (£457m).

However, the “emerging markets” employ the majority of G4S’ staff. 31% of workers are in the Middle East and India alone. Here, and in Africa, security for energy, mining, and oil and gas extraction industries are key businesses alongside general corporate and government contracting.

G4S has approximately 570,000 employees spread worldwide. Staff turnover is high, over 25% a year, and the company recruits around 150,000 new workers each year. G4S identifies one of its “key risks” as poaching of skilled staff by competitors. Wages are the bulk of the company’s costs – staff costs were £5.43 billion in 2017. But workers are not well paid: the average annual pay was just £9,534. In the UK, G4S recognises the GMB union; it also has a European Works Council.

Another risk involves “negative impacts” on “employees’ health and safety” – including security staff being killed or attacked. In 2017, 25 workers died on the job last year (down from 47 in 2016): 11 of these in road accidents, as opposed to eight in armed attacks. G4S acknowledges three “non-accidental deaths” of prisoners in its custody in 2017, down from nine in 2016.

In 2017 G4S exited from some unprofitable and controversial business lines, including its main Israeli operations – as well as UK children’s homes and youth detention.

Outlook and strategies

Global security is a boom industry. As the world becomes a more hostile and dangerous place, and with growing inequality and ecological collapse, corporations, states, and the rich have a growing demand for security guards. G4S sees growth everywhere, but notes Asia-Pacific as a particular growth region.

In particular, G4S sees the best prospects in “sophisticated security technology”, and “integrated products”, which combine tech with “manned security”.

On the one hand, there is rapid development of new weapons and technologies. On the other, “barriers to entry” are low in “manned security”, so there is less competition at the high-tech end of the market. And as the majority of G4S’ costs go on labour, automation can be a key way to increase margins. In 2017 tech security brought in £2.45 billion revenue, about a third of the total, and the company wants to grow this area further.

Key issues

Detention and prison profiteering: “G4S Care and Justice”

This is the division which runs prisons and immigration detention. It is currently active in the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Care and Justice makes up 7% of G4S’ total revenues. As well as locking people up, Care and Justice also takes other government contracts related to managing imprisoned and vulnerable people, e.g., asylum housing and electronic tagging.

G4S Care and Justice (UK) currently has contracts including:

• five Ministry of Justice prison contracts: HMP Altcourse, HMP Birmingham, HMP Oakwood, HMP/YOI Parc, HMP Rye Hill;

• Gatwick detention centres (Brook House and Tinsley House);

• a separate contract to run the Tinsley House family unit where children are detained;

• healthcare in Serco-managed Yarl’s Wood detention centre, as well as the Gatwick centres;

• two COMPASS asylum housing contracts (Yorkshire, Humberside and the North East; Midlands and East of England);

• police support and police station management contracts;

• and a new (2017) electronic tagging contract – despite the 2013 scandal where it lost an earlier tagging contract, was investigated for fraud, and was temporarily banned from bidding for new government contracts.

Beyond the UK, G4S Care and Justice (South Africa) has a 25 year contract to run Mangaung maximum security prison, which opened in 2001, and which it describes as “the second largest private prison in the world”, with nearly 3000 inmates. Others have described it as “a private hell”

G4S Care and Justice (Australia and New Zealand) runs three Australian prisons, and tagging and police support services in the two countries. It previously ran Australia’s notorious Manus Island offshore immigration detention centre – but exited this contract swiftly in 2014 after horrific mistreatment was exposed, including one guard being convicted of murder.

The detention and prisons part of the business is extremely profitable. Internal G4S documents, reported on last September by the BBC and the Guardian, showed the company making profit rates over 20% for Brook House, and even over 40% for Tinsley House in 2016. This is despite the fact that the profit margins officially agreed in their contracts are far lower: 6.8% in the case of Brook House. G4S is supposed to pass cost savings onto the Home Office; whether or how this happens in practice is unknown.

It is also despite G4S paying a record £2.88 million in penalties for breaches in its Ministry of Justice prison contracts in 2016/17 – it has paid over £7 million altogether since 2010.

Prisons and detention centres are perhaps the most profitable of all G4S business. But this line of work also carries higher risks: both in terms of frequent scandals, and when the company tries to expand into less well-known areas of government work such as loss-making housing contracts. That said, recent detention scandals have showed no signs of affecting profits or share prices (although the fortunes of outsourcers generally has, see below). G4S is not currently flagging up prisons as a growth area for the company – but there is little doubt it will bid for new opportunities when they arise.

Asylum housing

However, one “Care and Justice” deal has not performed so well: the COMPASS asylum housing contracts. G4S has been losing substantial sums on these deals – though it still appears to be bidding for the new round of asylum housing tenders currently underway.

In 2012, the Home Office reorganised its system of housing asylum seekers (outside detention). Previously, there was a mixture of housing arrangements run by local authorities as well as private companies. Now all housing is provided by large private companies under regional contracts called “COMPASS” – “Commercial and Operational Managers Procuring Asylum Support Services”. The Home Office said it hoped to save £150 million over seven years through this arrangement. The six contracts were awarded to just three companies: G4S, Serco and Clearsprings Group. G4S won the contracts for “North East England, Yorkshire and the Humber” and “Midlands and East of England”.

But, as the Home Affairs Committee points out: “although the system of three Providers looks straightforward on the surface, below it lies a complex network of contractors, sub-contractors and hundreds of private landlords.” G4S’ sub-contractors include: Live Management Group Ltd, Target Housing Association, UHS Ltd, Mantel Estates Ld, Jomast, Cascade.

The Compass contracts are due to end in August 2019. They were initially scheduled for five years, plus an optional two year extension, which the Home Office took. Although full details are not clear, the new arrangement looks set to be very similar, based on seven large regional contracts. They are due to be awarded in Autumn 2018.

The corporations complain that they have made heavy losses on the COMPASS contracts. G4S and Serco, in particular, seemed to have seriously messed up preparing for the deal. Both had problems early on with sub-contractors and failed to source all the properties they had expected; both complained they hadn’t anticipated the problems of negotiating with councils over properties; G4S took on properties without inspecting them. Then the mess got deeper as the “refugee crisis” arrived and the Home Office got even further behind in processing claims, meaning the numbers of people to be housed swelled.

Despite all this, G4S and Serco are interested in continuing in this business – if the Home Office will increase its fees. The signs are that the Home Office will agree to pump more money into the system, so that its contractors can turn a profit. In March 2018, G4S’ CEO Ashley Almanza explained to analysts how he expected the Government would offer better terms:

“Clearly the customer is very keen to have us in the process. … There are only two other suppliers in the market who’ve got the expertise to manage a very, very, very complex contract. If the contract was offered on the same terms, clearly we would not participate. I’m going to guess that the other supplier would also not participate. We’ve both seen enough to know that that’s not a viable model. I think there’s every sign that the customer understands that, knows that. The discussions are constructive and positive.”

Conditions in asylum housing are notorious. South Yorkshire Migration and Asylum Action Group (SYMAAG) have collected numerous horror stories from people housed in Yorkshire and other areas. In Sheffield, a toddler with cancer is dumped by G4S in rat-infested accommodation. In Manchester, Serco don’t treat bedbug outbreaks but simply wrap infested mattresses in plastic covers. These are not exceptional cases: water leakage, fire hazards, mould, rats, cockroaches and bedbugs appear standard. In Birmingham, Migrant Voice published a survey of G4S-run housing in January 2017 noting filthy accommodation, broken windows and furniture, vermin infestations, and more issues were commonplace.

Technology: robot guards and AI controls

G4S sees technology, including automation, as key to its future development. For several years it has been developing technologies including artificial intelligence monitoring of CCTV systems and access control, and of course robot guards.

This area is led by a subsidiary called G4S Technology Ltd based in Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire. G4S has been an active partner of state-sponsored security tech schemes: e.g., the EU STRANDS robot project involving a number of universities (Birmingham, Lincoln, Leeds, Aaachen, Vienna, and the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm).

Conflict zones

In 2017, G4S sold its main Israeli business, which had been heavily involved in prisons and the occupied territories, for £88 million. However it still retains a 25% stake in the central Israel police training facility, called Policity. In fact its most recent Annual Report stills list three Israel subsidiaries: G4S Israel PPP Ltd; G4S international Logistics (Israel); and Policity Ltd (25%).

G4S bought the Armorgroup mercenary company in 2008, which was a major private military contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan and involved in numerous scandals. G4S continues to win major security contracts in both countries.

G4S has subsidiaries in tyrannical regimes including Sudan (Armorgroup Sudanese Co Ltd) and Syria (Group 4 Syria). Its Sudanese business has included working closely with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – now the army of South Sudan, accused by the UN of war crimes involving “appalling instances of cruelty”.

In more detail

History

G4S’ roots are in Scandinavia. Two Danes, Philip Sørensen and Marius Hogrefe, founded the guarding company København Fredriksberg Nattevagt in 1901 – it would later become Securicor. Soon after, in 1906, Sophus Falck established a fire and rescue company called Redningskorpet – which would later become Falck. These companies expanded and bought up other security firms through Scandinavia and beyond, including Securicor’s UK subsidiary which later became independent under the name Group 4.

G4S, under its various guises, has been at the forefront of the private prison and detention industry in the UK. Back in 1970, Securicor was given the very first contract to run a purpose-built immigration detention centre, Harmondsworth. In 1991, Group 4 won the management of the UK’s first privatised prison, the Wolds in Hampshire. In 1997, Securicor took on the first prison PFI contract. In 2008, G4S absorbed GLS, another company heavily involved in running UK detention centres. In 2011, G4S won the contract to run Birmingham Prison, the first time a public-sector prison has been transferred into private management.

Securicor and Falck merged in 2000, and the two re-merged with Group 4 in 2004. The company listed on the London Stock Exchange, and the combined group was rebranded as G4S in 2006. Then CEO Nick Buckles led the firm on a rapid expansion, buying up numerous global subsidiaries in the 2000s. One notable acquisition was Wackenhut, the second largest US security firm, in 2002. (The prison part of Wackenhut’s business was sold on and became GEO – see profile below.) Another was the mercenary firm Armorgroup in 2008, which has been active in warzones such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan.

But Buckles’ vision crashed in 2011. The planned £5 billion acquisition of Danish facilities management giant ISS, which would have moved G4S out of security and into general outsourcing on a big scale, was over-ambitious. This costly deal was cancelled after a shareholder rebellion. Soon after, G4S was hit with its two biggest scandals yet: the 2012 Olympics fiasco, and the 2013 electronic tagging scandal which led to it being banned from bidding for new UK government contracts for six months.

Buckles stepped down in May 2013, and new boss Ashley Almanza embarked on a restructuring programme. The expansion drive ended, with the company offloading troublesome subsidiaries. It claims now to be focusing back on the “core” business, with less high-risk deals. This approach seems to be working, with a slow but steady growth rate over the last four years.

Read more background in our extended “G4S: A Company Profile” from 2012.

Picture: CEO Ashley Almanza.

Bosses

G4S’ current directors are a grey bunch. There are no ex-politicians on the board, and members are mainly from the world of European corporates and finance. Chief Executive Ashley Almanza (appointed 2013) is a South African accountant connected to the oil and gas industry. He worked for many years as a finance officer for British Gas, and is a director of offshorer drilling contractor Noble Corporation. The non-executive chairman, John Connolly, is an accountant who worked all of his career at Deloitte. He is also chair of Great Ormond Street Hospital Charity. One non-exec director, John Mogford, is CEO of water company United Utilties. Others have links to companies like Syngenta, Cap Gemini, Volvo, BAE Systems, as well as investment trusts and private equity.

Executive pay

Almanza was paid £3.85 million in 2017, down on his £4.79 million the year before. This is 403 times the average G4S pay. It includes a basic salary of £939,755, an annual bonus of £1.12 million and a “long term incentive plan” (LTIP) of an extra £1.44 million. All of the “LTIP”, and 85% of the annual bonus, is awarded depending on meeting financial targets. There is no assessment relating to “ethics” or “Corporate Social Responsibility”, although the other 15% of LTIP includes an assessment for “health and safety”. In the year of the Brook House scandal, Almanza was scored 11 out of 15 on this part of his bonus.

Finances

G4S is profitable and growing: after a few tricky years that saw a series of lower-than-expected profits, G4S is bouncing back. Revenues reached £7.4 billion last year; overall growth was 17% over four years from 2013 to 2017. Overall profit in 2017 was £236 million, also up 17% on 2013. (“Operating profit” was £502 million). The majority of net profit is paid out to shareholders in dividends: £145m in both of the last two years.

Revenue growth often depends on winning large contracts, and this can mean it has ups and downs depending on specific big customers. But it is in nothing like the trouble of other outsourcers like Mitie or Capita. Security is generally more profitable than other outsourcing sectors; and G4S has a diverse worldwide client base, rather than depending on a few big government deals for work.

Profits by region broadly reflect the size of those markets. G4S made £345 million before tax and interest in the “developed world”, £198 million from “emerging markets”. Business is particularly profitable in the UK and Ireland: £118 million, almost as high as £123 million from North America and higher than £104 million from Europe, even though it brings in less revenue than either.

Share price: G4S’ share price has been hit in the wake of Carillion’s collapse, which has made investors nervous about outsourcing companies in general. But the markets didn’t seem bothered at all about the Brook House abuse scandal – in fact G4S shares rose in the weeks after that broke.

Taxation: overall, G4S has an effective tax rate of 33% in 2017 (26% in 2016).

Cashflow and debt: G4S has enough cash to pay its bills and has cut down its debt levels over the last few years. As of the end of 2017 it had almost £600m in cash plus an extra £1bn of overdraft facilities with banks that it can access. It has overall debts of just under £1.5 billion but its accounts suggest these should not cause significant problems. Again, the company has reduced its debt levels significantly over recent years. It has a less than impressive BBB- credit rating from Standard & Poor’s rating agency – that’s the bottom of the so-called ‘investment grade’ level which allows major pension funds to buy its shares. G4S regularly issues bonds in Sterling, Euros and Dollar markets.

Owners and investors

G4S is a public limited company, listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and also on the NASDAQ OMX exchange in Copenhagen. In recent years it has been popping in and out of the FSE100 index, which lists the 100 biggest LSE traded companies.

Like many big PLCs, most of its shares are owned by major global fund managers. At the end of 2017 its biggest shareholders were: Invesco (13.05%), BlackRock (6.02%), Harris Associates (5.11%), and Mondrian Investment Partners (5.07%).

There have been high profile cases of investors selling G4S shares after public campaigning around Israel – notably the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation which withdrew a $170m stake in 2014. The “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” (BDS) campaign may well have prompted the 2017 sale of G4S Israel. Still, it is hard to say what substantial impact if any there has been on G4S’ overall finances: there are plenty more ready to invest so long as the profits are coming in.

G4S Scandal sheet

Just a few highlights. See also: G4SFacts website; Stop G4S facebook group with regular updates; detailed 2016 dossier on UK incidents by Liberty.

(2018) Birmingham prison deaths: in March and April 2018, five inmates died within seven weeks in G4S’ notorious prison.

(2017) Brook House: undercover filming exposed guard brutality inside the Gatwick Detention centre, leading to several sackings and an ongoing “independent” inquiry. Yet G4S has still had its contract to run the two Gatwick detention centres extended for a further two years.

(2017) DAPL pipleline: G4S provided security for the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline in the US, which has been resisted by indigenous communities.

(2016) Birmingham Prison Riots: some of the heaviest recent riots in UK prisons took place in the G4S-run prison, before being quelled by 10 Tornado teams of (public sector) anti-riot officers.

(2016) Exit from Palestine: G4S has now exited most of its Israeli businesses – although some subsidiaries remain listed in its latest Annual Report. G4S was a major collaborator with the occupation in Palestine, working with prisons, checkpoints, settlement businesses, and Israeli police, including in the occupied West Bank. Our 2015 report on the Israeli prison industry, and this 2011 report by WhoProfits, document these activities in detail.

(2016) Orlando gunman: the killer of five people was a long term G4S employee.

(2016) Quits youth detention business: after BBC Panorama exposed horrific scenes of brutality inside its youth prisons.

(2016) Bogus 999 calls: five G4S police station staff were suspended in Lincolnshire after claims they had logged fake emergency calls to help meet targets.

(2014) Manus Island: killing of Reza Barati. G4S guards in the Australian migrant detention camp in Papua New Guinea were accused of beating detainees with hoses and iron bars. After one Iranian man was killed, two men including a G4S guard who threw a rock onto his head, were convicted of his murder. G4S ended its Manus contract the month after.

(2013) South African prison torture: reports of horrific torture and abuse by G4S guards at Mangaung Prison, dubbed “a private hell”.

(2013) Tagging scandal: a Serious Fraud Office investigation opened after reports of massive over-billing by G4S and Serco in their electronic tagging contracts. The two companies were temporarily banned from UK government contracts. But this was lifted in 2014 after G4S agreed to pay back £109 million. Despite all this, G4S won a new Ministry of Justice tagging contract in 2017.

(2012) London Olympics fiasco: G4S took a $355 million contract to provide security at the 2012 Olympics, then failed to recruit enough guards, leading the Army to step in and take over security.

(2012-ongoing) G4S and Serco each won two of the UK government’s COMPASS asylum housing contracts in 2012. Appalling slum conditions in their accommodation has been well documented. Despite losing money on the existing contracts, both companies appear to be bidding for renewals.

(2011) The false leg tag: in one oft-cited anecdote, G4S were caught tagging a man’s prosthetic leg.

(2010) Killing of Jimmy Mubenga. Three G4S “escorts” held down and killed 46 year old Jimmy Mubenga as he was being deported to Angola. Although the inquest jury found he had been “unlawfully killed”, the guards were acquitted of manslaughter in 2014. The judge ruled that evidence of “endemic racism” in the G4S workforce could not be used in evidence.

(2010) US Senate Inquiry finds G4S’ ArmorGroup subsidiary in Afghanistan “relied on local warlords … linked to murder, kidnappings, bribery” to supply its men and weapons.

(2009) G4S Armorgroup Iraq killings: G4S mercenary Daniel Fitzsimons shot dead two colleagues in the Baghdad “green zone”, after the company had received repeated warnings about him.

(2008) Death of Mr Ward: the aboriginal elder was “cooked to death” in a G4S van transporting him to court in Western Australia.

NB: unless other sources are stated, information comes from the company’s annual reports and accounts. Latest information can be found here on its website.

The post G4S: company profile 2018 appeared first on Corporate Watch.

The post Elbit Systems Company Profile appeared first on Corporate Watch.

The post Apartheid in the fields: From occupied Palestine to UK Supermarkets appeared first on Corporate Watch.

Demolition of a home in East Jerusalem, as depicted by a child of the Amro family. The children continue to suffer from anxiety, trauma, and bedwetting following the partial demolition of their home in 2015.

Sodastream, Hewlett Packard, and Barclays Bank have been among a number of key targets of Palestine solidarity activists in the last few years, not to mention G4S, Elbit Systems and EDO MBM. High street supermarkets Sainsbury’s and Waitrose and now even the Co-op Bank are also facing criticism for their business practices, regarded as undermining Palestinian human rights and being complicit in illegal Israeli occupation.

Such solidarity campaigns help Palestinian children in particular, as it is a cruel but true reality that they suffer disproportionately from the occupation. Over 550 children were killed in the 2014 bombing of Gaza alone, with child mortality sharply on the rise with the continuing siege. Settler violence towards children in the West Bank is also worsening: in 2015 arson attacks and tear gas inhalation resulted in very young babies dying,whilst simply attempting to get to school in Hebron has become a nightmare. The age of criminal responsibility for Palestinian children is also becoming ever lower, with hundreds subject to the violence and humiliation of Israeli detention each year. House demolitions and the ever present threat of them – from East Jerusalem to the Jordan Valley – continue to terrify, traumatise, destroy and degrade. The drawings by children of the Amro family in East Jerusalem, featured above, are evidently testament to such systematic child abuse – shocking yet common under occupation. Here is an account by their father, Nurredin Amro.

UK consumers can help to end the systematic denial of childhood to Palestinian children by supporting the call for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel, otherwise known as the BDS movement. Yet what about BDS supporters shopping for children in particular? Ethical Consumer has produced an extremely useful guide on how to shop ethically when buying products for babies and children. However, few guides have focused specifically on Palestine. Here are the main companies to avoid for those who want to support Palestine.

Pampers

Environmental and animal rights considerations aside, what nappy you buy can also have human rights implications. Pampers is a US company which sells a range of nappies, training pants and wipes for babies and toddlers. The business is owned by Proctor and Gamble, one of the largest clients of Israeli company Avgol Nonwoven Industries (P & G accounts for approximately 40% of their sales). Avgol Nonwoven Industries has a production factory located in Barkan, an industrial zone in an illegal West Bank settlement in the occupied territories. By purchasing from the company you are supporting the illegal settlement economy which further strengthens the occupation, undermining Palestinian rights. More information can be obtained from the Israeli research group Who Profits?.

Taf Toys

Taf Toys is an arm of Israeli company Taf Plastic Products Ltd and sells a range of baby and toddler products including soft toys, play mats, walkers and baby gyms. Parent company Taf Plastic Products Ltd is located in the city of Netanya in Northern Israel. Products in the UK are available from a number of retailers including John Lewis, Argos and tax avoiding Amazon UK. Supporters of the BDS movement should take heed.

Halilit

Israeli company Halilit has become a near-ubiquitous seller of musical instruments and educational toys for babies and toddlers in a large number of countries. Products are available in the UK from a number of retailers including JoJo Maman Bebe , Debenhams and Argos. The company is based in the Tel Aviv district of Or-Yehuda, which has a particularly bloody history – the neighbourhood was built on the Palestinian village of Saqiya which was forcibly cleared of Palestinians in the Palestinian nakba (catastrophe) of 1948. Campaigners have highlighted this company as clearly ripe for boycott .
To take action beyond simply boycotting the individual companies, we recommend contacting the retailers who sell their products and asking them to stop. You can also join your local Palestine solidarity group to take direct action collectively.

The post Palestinian solidarity for parents appeared first on Corporate Watch.

As the anniversary of last year’s seven week long massacre by Israel in the Gaza Strip draws closer, evidence obtained by Corporate Watch shows that a French company manufactured equipment used by the Israeli military in Gaza last year. Photos taken by International Solidarity Movement activist Charlie Andreasson on 7 August 2014 show that a military battery pack manufactured in the US by French company SAFT was discarded in the village of Khuza’a in the southern Gaza Strip after one of the worst massacres of the attack.

The photos were taken in a house which was occupied by Israeli soldiers during July 2014. One photo shows a notice from the Israeli military to people living in the villages in the countryside east of Khan Younis, requiring them to leave their homes and go to the centre of the city until further notice. The notice said that if they did not go then they would be in danger. Other photos show shrapnel on the floor and cases for bullets.

Ammunition containers left by Israeli soldiers n a home in Khuza’a

Notices dropped by the Israeli military ordering Khuza’a residents to leave their homes

Map of the area for evacuation

Shrapnel from a shell fired by the Israeli military in Khuza’a

According to an article by Mondoweiss based on first hand accounts, on 23 July Israeli forces entered the village of Khuza’a, firing bullets and artillery shells at people trying to flee. Ambulance crews that had negotiated with the Israeli forces to rescue the wounded were also fired on. A missile was fired at a local clinic where people were attempting to obtain emergency treatment. Throughout the day medical crews were prevented from helping the wounded.

Later in the day, soldiers occupied several houses around Khuza’a, turning them into military posts. People trying to leave the village, many carrying white flags, were fired on with bullets and missiles from planes, helicopters and drones.

One resident, Mohamed Ismail, sent out accounts on Twitter. His updates read:

“My family & I made it out, light injuries. Hundreds of casualties, bodies in the streets. Many of the dead in Khuza’a bled to death bc ambulances unable to reach. From my window I watched a 20 yr old die for hours. One doctor, Kamal Abu Rjeila, treated injuries that came into his clinic even after it was bombed & his father killed. The Israeli army used ten families as human shields. They took over their homes and wouldn’t let them escape. Home I was sheltering in with 50 others was bombed. I don’t know what happened to them but my shoes soaked in their blood. We escaped to our home under the cover of the dust from the bombing. Minutes later, it was hit by 3 artillery shells. We tried to escape on foot to Khuza’a’s exit, but helicopters fired on us. I saw a woman carrying her dead child in one arm and a white flag in the other. She used the white flag to wrap his body. As we walked I saw my uncle and his son, dead on the road next to their house. Snipers were hitting people in the legs. My other cousin died trying to save his bleeding brother in the street. They died on top of each other. There are corpses still lying in the streets, injured people waiting to become corpses, families who still haven’t escaped”.

SAFT is a multinational company headquartered in France. It produces batteries used in the aviation, transport (tram and metro), oil and gas and telecommunications industries as well as for military use. The battery pack photogaphed in Khuza’a was from the US, where SAFT has a significant presence.

The battery found in the house in Khuza’a had, written on it in English and Hebrew, “SAFT AMERICA INC standard issue organic lithium battery, date of manufacture Feb. 2013”

The civil socitety call for boycott, divestment and sanctions calls for campaigners to target companies involved in supplying equipment used by the Israeli military. Activists should consider campaigning for SAFT’s non-military contractors to drop their contracts with SAFT over its complicity in Israel’s attacks on Palestinians.

The post French multinational SAFT complicit in Gaza massacre appeared first on Corporate Watch.